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CRIMINAL LAW
THE CORPORATE INSANITY DEFENSE
MIHAILIS E. DIAMANTIS *
0F

Corporate criminal justice rests on the fiction that corporations possess
“minds” capable of instantiating culpable mens rea. The retributive and
deterrent justifications for punishing criminal corporations are strongest
when those minds are well-ordered. In such cases misdeeds are most likely
to reflect malice, and sanctions are most likely to have their intended
preventive benefits. But what if a corporate defendant’s mind is disordered?
Organizational psychology and economics have tools to identify normally
functioning organizations that are fully accountable for the harms they
cause. These disciplines can also diagnose dysfunctional organizations
where the threads of accountability may have frayed and where sanctions
would not deter. Punishing such corporations undermines the goals of
criminal law, leaves victim interests unaddressed, and is unfair to corporate
stakeholders.
This Article argues that some corporate criminal defendants should be
able to raise the insanity defense. Statutory text makes the insanity defense
available to all qualifying defendants. When a corporate criminal
defendant’s mind is sufficiently disordered, basic criminal law purposes also
support the defense. Corporate crime in these cases may trace to
dysfunctional systems or subversive third parties rather than to corporate
malice. For example, individual corporate employees may thwart wellmeaning corporate policies to pursue personal advantage at the expense of
the corporation itself. Corporations then may seem more like victims of their
own misconduct rather than perpetrators of it.
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa, College of Law. For invaluable feedback, I
owe thanks to Richard Redding, Matiangai Sirleaf, William Thomas and participants at the
Chapman Junior Faculty Works-in-Progress Conference and the Iowa Law Faculty Workshop
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1

2

DIAMANTIS

[Vol. 111

Justice and prevention favor treatment of insane corporations rather
than punishment. Recognizing the corporate insanity defense would better
serve victims’ and stakeholders’ interests in condemning and preventing
corporate misconduct. Treatment would create an opportunity for
government experts to reform dysfunctional corporations in a way that
predominant modes of corporate punishment cannot. Effective reform takes
victims seriously by minimizing the chance that others will be harmed. It also
spares corporate stakeholders unnecessary punishment for corporate
misconduct that could be sanctioned in more constructive ways.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 3
I. SUSPENDING SKEPTICISM (AT LEAST UNTIL PART V) ...... 12
II. MEASURING MADNESS ............................................................ 19
III. LEGALLY INSANE CORPORATIONS ..................................... 29
A. Satisfying the Volitional Test.............................................. 30
B. Satisfying the Cognitive Test .............................................. 37
IV. THE ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY OF CORPORATE
PATHOLOGY ......................................................................... 43
A. Corporate Psychopathy ....................................................... 44
1. The Law’s Role in Fostering Corporate Psychopathy .. 47
2. Corporate Psychopathy Not Eligible for the Defense ... 50
B. Corporate Irrationality and Identity Disorders .................... 55
1. The Law’s Role in Fostering Corporate Irrationality .... 56
2. Mere Corporate Identity Disorders Not Eligible........... 61
V. THE DEFENSE IN PRACTICE .................................................... 63
A. Treatment after Acquittal .................................................... 65
B. The Role of the Jury ............................................................ 71
C. Evidentiary Standards.......................................................... 74
1. At Trial .......................................................................... 75
2. Post-Trial Commitment ................................................ 76
3. Release .......................................................................... 80
VI. VINDICATING VICTIMS........................................................... 83
A. Justice Interests ................................................................... 83
B. Expressive Interests ............................................................. 85
C. Preventive Interests ............................................................. 87
CONCLUSION: WILL CORPORATIONS GO FOR IT? ................. 90

2021]

THE CORPORATE INSANITY DEFENSE

3

“[E]liminating the insanity defense would remove . . .
the vitally important distinction between illness and evil.” 1
1F

INTRODUCTION
There is a class of offenders, numbering in the millions, 2 that leading
psychologists believe are constitutively psychotic. 3 Their behavior routinely
defies common sense and ranges from bizarre to patently self-destructive. 4
Even though this behavior frequently exposes these offenders to crippling
criminal liability, 5 not a single one has raised, let alone benefitted from, an
insanity plea. 6 By failing to recognize the role that illness can play in bringing
about their crimes, the law unjustly punishes defendants who do not deserve
it. More importantly, the law undermines victims’ interests. By refusing to
properly treat these defendants’ underlying disorder, the law leaves in place
an unpredictable disposition to reoffend that risks creating future victims and
diminishes the significance of past victims’ suffering.
The “people” who comprise this group of offenders are for-profit
corporations. The public’s indignation at rampant corporate misconduct is
palpable and justified. 7 Pharmaceutical companies poison our citizens, 8 car
2F

3F

4F

5F

6F

7F

1

8F

ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 223 (1967).
The U.S. Census Bureau puts the figure at nearly seven million. 2015-2016 SUSB
Employment Change Data Tables, U.S. & States, Totals, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/susb/2016-susb-employment.html
[https://perma.cc/6YYY-VW6C] (last visited Sept. 3, 2019)
3
See infra Part IV.A.
4
Id.
5
See Peter R. Reilly, Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied: We Must End Our Failed
Experiment in Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 2015 BYU L. REV. 307, 320–22
(2015) (“If a corporation decides to go to trial and loses, it might face debarment or
exclusion . . . . For companies that depend heavily on contracts with the federal government,
exclusion and debarment can amount to a corporate death penalty.”) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); Larry Thompson, The Blameless Corporation, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1323, 1325–26 (2009) (“The other dimension of the conundrum of corporate criminal
liability, which is the collateral consequences if you are convicted, is enormous.”).
6
At least, I have found no examples.
7
See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049,
2077–80 (2016) (describing the psychological mechanisms behind blaming corporations).
8
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Obtains $1.4 Billion
from Reckitt Benckiser Group in Largest Recovery in a Case Concerning an Opioid Drug in
United States History (July 11, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentobtains-14-billion-reckitt-benckiser-group-largest-recovery-case
[https://perma.cc/6T7GC9WX] (“We are confronting the deadliest drug crisis in our nation’s history.”) (quoting
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the Department of Justice Jody Hunt).
2
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companies blacken our skies, 9 and multinational conglomerates corrupt our
democracies. 10 We can only hope that government functionaries feel the
same indignation when they respond. 11
However, we should hesitate before reflexively calling on criminal law
to punish every corporate harm. As I argue below, traditional modes of
corporate punishment often do little to address victims’ needs and nothing to
address their deepest concerns. 12 Furthermore, behind any large corporation
are thousands or millions of innocent stakeholders—employees,
shareholders, creditors, and consumers 13—whose wellbeing is also on the
line. 14 Although justice favors punishing culpable corporations, it also favors
sparing these stakeholders the burdens of sanction when neither they nor their
corporations are culpable. Criminal liability should not be a one-way ratchet.
Some crime should be punished; other crime should be managed. Doctrines
9F

10F

11F

12F

13F

14F

9

See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty and
Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six Volkswagen Executives and Employees
are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billioncriminal-and-civil-penalties-six [https://perma.cc/Q5FZ-GSJQ] (“If the software detected that
the vehicle was not being tested, it operated in a different mode, in which the vehicle’s
emissions control systems were reduced substantially, causing the vehicle to emit NOx up to
40 times higher than U.S. standards.”).
10
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead
Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in
Combined
Criminal
Fines
(Dec.
15,
2008),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html
[https://perma.cc/GMV5-VYHQ] (“Siemens AG engaged in systematic efforts to falsify its
corporate books and records . . . [in order to hide nearly a billion dollars for making] corrupt
payments to foreign officials through the payment mechanisms, which included cash desks
and slush funds.”).
11
See generally William S. Laufer, Where Is the Moral Indignation Over Corporate
Crime?, in REGULATING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 19 (Dominik Brodowski, Manuel
Espinoza de los Monteros de la Parra, Klaus Tiedemann & Joachim Vogel eds., 2014) (arguing
that prosecutors should show more genuine indignation at corporate misconduct).
12
See infra Part VI.
13
Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes,
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 825 (2003) (“Stakeholders are people whose financial well-being is tied
to the corporation’s success, such as employees, suppliers, charities, and communities.”).
14
See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2009) (“This punishment is inflicted instead on human
beings whose guilt remains unproven. Innocent shareholders pay the fines, and innocent
employees, creditors, customers, and communities sometimes feel the pinch too.”).
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that establish guilt must be tempered by doctrines that excuse and treat the
blameless and unblameable. 15
Some will mistakenly think this Article is an exercise in corporate
apology. It is worth pausing now, at the start, to insist adamantly to the
contrary. This will be clear by the Article’s end, after I have discussed the
consequences of a successful corporate insanity plea. The motivating impulse
of this Article is to meet the needs of individuals affected by corporate crime,
both victims and innocent corporate stakeholders. While these interests
should be the guiding light of corporate criminal law, that law presently
disserves them all. Ordinarily, sensitivity to victim and stakeholder interests
might require a zero-sum tradeoff of one against the other. 16 The corporate
insanity defense provides a rare opportunity to advance both simultaneously,
without requiring any legislative intervention.
Now is a good time to reconsider the scope and demands of the insanity
defense. In March 2020, the Supreme Court decided Kahler v. Kansas and
held that the Constitution 17 does not require states to offer the defense. 18
Kahler is a middle-aged white male. Commentators should pause to
considered what implications the arguments in his case might have for
defendants who are different from him. For example, some jurisdictions
categorically exclude juveniles from raising the insanity defense, despite the
fact that mental health is as much a concern among the young as it is among
adults. 19 Similarly, all jurisdictions tacitly exclude corporations from the
insanity defense. These exclusions are likely mistakes. I address the
15F

16F

17F

18F

19F

15

HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 414–15 (1979) (“Condemning one
who is blameless is universally abhorred as an injustice, and it is astonishing that those who
advocate criminal liability regardless of culpability do not perceive this abhorrence as an
insurmountable obstacle to the adoption of their program.”); Paul H. Robinson, A System of
Excuses: How Criminal Law’s Excuse Defenses Do, and Don’t, Work Together to Exculpate
Blameless (and Only Blameless) Offenders, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 259, 261 (2009)
[hereinafter Robinson, A System of Excuses]; Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A
Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 229 (1982) (“Excuses do not destroy blame, as
do the three groups of defenses previously discussed; rather, they shift if [sic] from the actor
to the excusing conditions.”) [hereinafter Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses].
16
For example, ordering a corporate criminal to pay restitution or a fine may satisfy victim
interests, but at the expense of corporate stakeholders who effectively pay the fine. GLANVILLE
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 863 (2d ed. 1961) (“[A] fine imposed on
the corporation is in reality aimed against shareholders who are not . . . responsible for the
crime, i.e., is aimed at innocent persons.”).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”).
18
140 S. Ct. 1021, 1027 (2020).
19
Emily S. Pollock, Note, Those Crazy Kids: Providing the Insanity Defense in Juvenile
Courts, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2041, 2041 (2001) (“[T]he affirmative insanity defense is, in many
jurisdictions, available to people over the age of eighteen but not to juveniles.”).
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corporate exclusion below and argue that corporations, like individuals, can
behave in ways that call reason and accountability into doubt.
The clearest, though by no means only, examples of such behavior
involve plainly self-destructive corporate conduct. Often thought to be
paragons of rational calculation, 20 corporations sometimes deviate in bizarre
ways, far from the path of maximum utility. Consider the textbook classic,
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California. 21 In the 1990s,
prosecutors accused Sun-Diamond of illegally funneling tens of thousands of
dollars to a political campaign. 22 Legally speaking, Sun-Diamond committed
bribery. 23 Colloquially speaking, it was, in the words of the D.C. Circuit,
“befuddled.” 24 Sun-Diamond had only the remotest of hypothetical interests
in the politician’s fortunes. The only sure result was that the payments
exposed the corporation to significant legal risks. As the court remarked,
Sun-Diamond looked more like a victim of its own misconduct. 25 While
bound by current law to uphold the conviction, the court chastised the
prosecutor for bringing the case in the first place. 26
Sun-Diamond represents a broader class of cases where selfundermining corporate behavior conflicts with the rational behavior that
responsible action presupposes. 27 In many instances of illegal conduct—
20F

21F

22F

23F

24F

25F

26F

27F

20
See Harvey M. Silets & Susan W. Brenner, The Demise of Rehabilitation: Sentencing
Reform and the Sanctioning of Organizational Criminality, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 367 (1986)
(“The corporation is a rational actor striving to maximize financial gain and minimize financial
loss, and so can be manipulated most easily by imposing monetary penalties that affect these
acts.”) (footnotes omitted).
21
138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
22
Id. at 969–70.
23
See id. at 977 (upholding corporate bribery conviction).
24
Id. at 970.
25
Id.
26
Id. (“Where there is adequate evidence for imputation (as here), the only thing that
keeps deceived corporations from being indicted for the acts of their employee-deceivers is
not some fixed rule of law or logic but simply the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”).
27
See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777, 783 (1985) (“Rationality is notoriously hard to define, but a reasonable
working definition would include reference to both the sensibleness of the actor’s goals and
the logic of the means chosen to achieve them . . . . In a rough and ready fashion, we may ask
whether, given the social context, any sense can be made of the actor’s goals, whether any
reasonable person could hold them, whether they are logically or empirically intelligible.”).
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from insider trading 28 to embezzlement 29—the criminal corporations are
often their own and only victims. Corporations can face criminal charges for
exposing their own secrets 30 and stealing from their own coffers. 31
Such bizarre corporate behavior only starts to make sense once we peel
back the fiction that defines corporations as unified legal subjects, and peek
inside at the real people, incentives, and systems that comprise them.
Realistically speaking, Sun-Diamond did not, in its corporate capacity, bribe
an irrelevant politician; an employee funneled Sun-Diamond’s money to a
personal friend. 32 Corporations do not share their own proprietary
information; employees commit insider trading using corporate secrets for
personal gain. 33 Corporations do not steal from themselves; employees
embezzle corporate funds for personal use. 34
Nonsensical corporate behavior is an inevitable byproduct of the
particular way that the law construes corporate “personhood.” 35 The law’s
simplistic conception of corporate psychology is unmoored from any
organizational science or economic sense. According to respondeat superior,
the centuries-old doctrine most jurisdictions use to hold an employer liable
for the actions of its employees, 36 corporations basically do and think
whatever their employees do and think. 37 This means that even when
28F

29F

30F

31F

32F

33F

34F

35F

36F

37F

28

John P. Anderson, When Does Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading Make
Sense?, 46 STETSON L. REV. 147, 156 (2016) (“It turns out that in most (though not all) cases
where a corporation is subject to criminal liability for the insider trading of its employees, it
(or its shareholders) is by theory of law also the principal victim of that same trading.”).
29
See City of New York v. Fox, 133 N.E. 434, 435 (1921) (“[T]he warden was just as
much responsible for the misappropriation by his appointee as he would have been if he had
committed the fault himself.”).
30
See JOHN P. ANDERSON, INSIDER TRADING: LAW, ETHICS, AND REFORM 113–14 (2018)
(“[In true insider trading cases], shareholders are forced to suffer the crime and the
punishment!”).
31
See, e.g., In re Chinacast Educ. Corp. Sec. Litig., 809 F.3d 471, 472–73 (9th Cir. 2015)
(attributing to corporation the fraudulent intent of CEO and CFO who embezzled millions of
corporate funds).
32
United States v. Sun-Diamond, 138 F.3d 961, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398
(1999).
33
SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 863–64 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that former
employee of software company used access to corporate secrets to commit insider trading).
34
Nat’l Football Scouting Inc. v. Cont’l Assur. Co., 931 F.2d 646, 649–50 (10th Cir. 1991)
(reversing summary judgment that had favored a corporation that employed an embezzling
employee).
35
See infra Part VI.B.
36
See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 496 (1909)
(recognizing, for the first time, the possibility of corporate criminal liability under federal law
for affirmative acts).
37
See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1841, Westlaw (database updated May 2019).
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employees do or think things that make no sense from the corporate
perspective, the law says corporate employers do and think those things as
well. It makes no legal difference how hard corporations try to keep their
employees on track through corrective policies and compliance procedures. 38
Ordinarily in criminal law, patently nonsensical behavior strongly
suggests that an individual criminal defendant has a condition that mitigates
his responsibility. 39 The law recognizes that bringing the full destructive
force of criminal sanctions to bear would be inappropriate in these
circumstances. 40 A different official response (like mental health treatment)
better meets the interests of justice.
I argue below that similar logic applies to some cases of corporate
misbehavior. Corporate misconduct often occurs in an evil organization that
deserves a harsh criminal justice response. But when corporate misconduct
disserves the corporation’s own interests, it may instead reflect a broken or
exploited organization, rather than an evil one. It is hard to see what
retributive or deterrent value there could be to punishment in those cases. If
a corporation is broken, it may lack the rational mechanisms needed to weigh
the deterrent costs of sanctions. If it is internally exploited, it already has
reason enough to prevent further misconduct. Either way, there seems to be
no tangible sense in which such corporations display the evil intent that is the
lynchpin of retributive justice. Punishing them neither fixes their dysfunction
nor sanctions the insiders who exploit them—it only serves to burden
innocent corporate stakeholders who may have already suffered because of
the underlying misconduct. 41
38F

39F

40F

41F

38
See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1973)
(“[Corporate liability for employee misconduct] may attach without proof that the conduct
was within the agent’s actual authority, and even though it may have been contrary to express
instructions.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.800, https://www.justice.gov/
usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations
[https://perma.cc/X733-HZ7C] (“[T]he existence of a compliance program is not sufficient,
in and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct undertaken by
its officers, directors, employees, or agents.”).
39
Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity
and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1117 (2007)
(“Rationality is the [philosophical] touchstone of responsibility, as the structure of criminal
law itself indicates.”).
40
Hotema v. United States, 186 U.S. 413, 416 (1902) (approving the following language
in a jury instruction: “Where reason ceases to have dominion over the mind proven to be
diseased, the person reaches a degree of insanity where criminal responsibility ceases and
accountability to the law for the purpose of punishment no longer exists.”).
41
See Alschuler, supra note 14, at 1367–68 (noting that innocent shareholders,
employees, and other stakeholders of a corporation are the ones who primarily suffer the
consequences of corporate criminal sanctions).
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Although the doctrinal focus of the corporate insanity defense must be
on corporate defendants, any broader policy justification must focus on
individuals. 42 Individual corporate stakeholders are surely one relevant
constituency, but victims should come first. The corporate insanity defense
would have no legitimate role in corporate criminal law if it undermined
victim interests. These interests include paying restitution, preventing future
corporate harms (whether to past or to future victims), and giving victims
their day in court to tell their stories and demand recognition. Corporate
criminal law must do better for victims. It (sometimes) delivers on restitution,
but unequivocally fails with respect to prevention and expressive values. 43
A corporate insanity defense would both prevent more corporate crime
and lead to more trials when corporations do commit crime, all without
compromising victim restitution. Introducing the possibility of finding
corporate defendants “not guilty only by reason of insanity” would lower the
barriers prosecutors face when initiating corporate trials and would thereby
provide a surer legal mechanism for recognizing corporate wrongs. The
consequences to corporate defendants of such a verdict—which would
include intensive compliance reform, the corporate equivalent of mental
health treatment—would better prevent offenses from recurring than the
penalties criminal corporations currently face.
There are two strategies the law could take to address its failure to
provide justice to victims and corporate stakeholders. The first and more
familiar approach is to call for radical legal change. Commentators in this
camp have suggested rewriting the law’s most basic doctrines for
understanding corporate conduct, thought, and liability. 44 Many of these
dramatic proposals would change things for the better, but they have little
realistic prospect of being adopted in the near future. Most would require
coordination among legislators, administrators, and judges. In the present
42F

43F

44F

42

See generally Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 95 (2014) (arguing that corporations only have standing to assert certain
constitutional rights on behalf of the corporations’ individual members). See also Margaret
M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1679 (2015) (“If the Court is going to recognize a corporate right,
it should be able to identify the specific group of natural persons from whom the corporate
right is derived.”).
43
See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate
Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 565–68 (2018).
44
See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099–101 (1991) (proposing corporate ethos,
rather than respondeat superior, as a measure of liability).
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political climate, even modest cooperation seems too much to hope for. 45
There is a long-lived status quo bias in corporate criminal law. Despite
decades of near-universal opposition to current doctrine, 46 the law has seen
little reform, and none is predicted.
Here, I adopt a different approach that aims to work within the law as it
presently stands, while also pointing out threads that have been overlooked,
unappreciated, and underexplored. The single strand I investigate here is the
law of excuses 47 and, in particular, the excuse provided to insane
defendants. 48 All but five U.S. jurisdictions absolve criminals who suffer
from serious mental disease or defect. 49 The prima facie legal case for a
corporate insanity defense in these jurisdictions is simple to state. Under
federal law, the insanity defense is available to any criminal “defendant,” 50
without regard to corporeal or corporate form. Under state law, the defense
is typically available to any “person,” 51 defined to include “any natural
person [or] . . . corporation.” 52 The deeper legal case draws on corporate
psychology, economics, and organizational science to show how
corporations can satisfy the legal definition of insanity and how recognizing
this would promote fundamental criminal justice policies.
In support of the individual insanity defense, leading commentator
Stephen J. Morse observed: “We should not abolish the insanity defense
unless we truly believe that every perpetrator of a criminal act deserves to be
punished, no matter how [mentally ill]. If we do not believe this . . . then we
must retain the defense.” 53 As I argue below, the corporate insanity defense
satisfies Morse’s bar: There are some corporations who do not deserve to be
punished because their crimes show they are, organizationally speaking, too
45F

46F

47F

48F

49F

50F

51F

52F

53F

45
Charles Gardner Geyh, Courts, Congress, and the Constitutional Politics of Interbranch
Restraint, 87 GEO. L.J. 243, 246 (1998) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS,
CONGRESS, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF INTERBRANCH RESTRAINT (1997)) (noting
increased interbranch conflicts between judges and legislators in a highly partisan era).
46
Ved P. Nanda, Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is A New Approach
Warranted?, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 605 (2010), reprinted in CORPORATE LIABILITY:
EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK 63, 85–87 (Mark Pieth & Radha Ivory eds., 2011).
47
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CATHERINE PALO, AVIK K. GANGULY, MYRON MOSKOVITZ & JANE
GRALL, 2 CRIM. L. DEF. Excuses—generally § 161, Westlaw (database updated July 2020).
48
Id. Insanity § 173.
49
Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal
Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 85 (2006).
50
18 U.S.C. § 17.
51
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. L. INST. 2019).
52
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(8) (AM. L. INST. 2019). State law uses “human being” when
it means to refer to members of the species homo sapiens. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.0(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
53
Morse, supra note 27, at 836.
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“ill.” Skeptical readers’ thoughts will naturally jump to extreme cases of
seemingly psychopathic corporations escaping conviction for heinous
crimes. I will address such cases head-on below. 54 For now, I note that
fixating on sensational crimes has corrupted perceptions of the individual
insanity defense for decades, and I hope to avoid the same here. 55 Rest
assured: psychopathic corporations would not qualify for the defense.
To meet Morse’s threshold, I need not wade into the thick of the
constitutional debate addressed by the Court in Kahler. While I will engage
the criminal justice fundamentals on which the case partially turned, I will
not suggest that corporations have a constitutional right to raise the insanity
defense. Unlike punishing insane individuals, 56 punishing disordered
corporations is neither “cruel” (they have no feelings) 57 nor “unusual” (we
have done it for more than a century). 58 There is no history or tradition that
would justify a fundamental due process right to the corporate insanity
defense. 59
After some preliminary clarifications (Part I), I begin by laying out the
history behind the insanity defense and its various present-day formulations
(Part II). I describe two corporate disorders that satisfy the legal definitions
of insanity (Part III). As I also show, recognizing the corporate insanity
defense for corporations with these disorders would advance basic criminal
justice goals like retribution and deterrence. I then contextualize these
disorders by describing several features of corporations—as conceived by the
law, economists, and organizational psychologists—that are common
sources of bizarre or destructive behavior (Part IV).
In the second half the Article, I turn to more pragmatic considerations
and describe what the defense might look like in practice (Part V). Most
importantly, a successful corporate insanity defense comes with strings
54F

55F

56F

57F

58F

59F

54

See infra Section III.A.
David B. Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 528, 531
(1985) (“[I]t is my belief that public disrespect for the defense erupts principally from insanity
acquittals in certain species of homicide cases.”).
56
Kahler argued in part that executing the insane violates the Eighth Amendment. See
Brief for Petitioner at 29, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135); see also
Stephen M. LeBlanc, Cruelty to the Mentally Ill: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to the
Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 (2007) (arguing that
abolishing the insanity defense would violate the Eighth Amendment).
57
Dynamic Image Techs. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34, 37 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000)
(“[C]orporations, unlike natural persons, have no emotions . . . .”).
58
See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95
(1909) (upholding criminal conviction of corporation).
59
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 49 (1996) (noting that state policy violates due
process if it conflicts with fundamental rules established in the historical traditions of the
country).
55
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attached. Like other insanity acquittees, insane corporations would undergo
intensive treatment and rehabilitation, during which various incapacitating
protocols would protect the public from reinjury. The Supreme Court has
recognized that jurisdictions have wide latitude to shape their insanity
doctrines and procedures. 60 Procedural adjustments—like shifting burdens
of proof and persuasion—could mitigate potential concerns about abuse and
overuse. Though scholars discussing the insanity defense typically focus on
defendants, an effective corporate insanity defense could be a major step
toward finally making corporate criminal law serve victim interests as well
(Part VI). The only remaining question is whether the defense would be
appealing enough for corporations to pursue. I conclude that, despite its costs
to corporate defendants, the insanity defense offers sufficiently attractive
advantages over presently available alternatives (Conclusion).
One more note of context before digging in: I have previously argued in
favor of punishing all corporations primarily by coercively reforming
them. 61 The basic idea is that corporate criminal fines are retributively
inappropriate (because they hit innocent shareholders) and ineffective at
deterring corporate misconduct (because they do not hit corporate decision
makers). Court-ordered reform could do better on both fronts. Here, I offer a
separate legal and policy-based argument for forcibly reforming a narrower
class of corporate criminals where reform is especially needed—those that
are legally insane.
60F

61F

I. SUSPENDING SKEPTICISM (AT LEAST UNTIL PART V)
I expect that many readers will greet the prospect of a corporate insanity
defense with some initial skepticism. The argument for it draws on concepts
from corporate criminal law, organizational psychology, systems theory, and
economics. To clear the path for what follows, I respond here to some
preliminary hurdles that might otherwise threaten to derail the conversation
before it starts. I aim to persuade readers to suspend their skepticism until I
have had a chance to explain in concrete terms what corporate insanity is and
to describe the tangible benefits of treating it rather than punishing it.
My thesis—that the criminal law should recognize a corporate insanity
defense—must be distinguished from three further theses that I do not
endorse and that do not follow as a matter of law or logic from what I do
endorse. First, the corporate insanity defense does not imply that all or even
most corporations should escape liability for their crimes. I have argued
60

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006).
See generally Diamantis, supra note 43 (arguing that coercive reform is the only just
and effective punishment for corporate criminals).
61
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extensively against this abolitionist position because I believe there are
values to punishing corporate misconduct that other systems of corporate
liability cannot replicate. 62 Properly understood, the corporate insanity
defense would apply only to “disease[d] or defect[ive]” corporations. 63 The
conditions that qualify a corporation for the defense must be relatively
infrequent, even among corporate criminals. One commentator has quipped
that “[i]ncorporation is the law’s most successful diminished capacity
defense.” 64 I hope to prove him right, but not in the way he intended.
Second, this Article’s focus on corporate liability does not imply that
responsible individuals within corporations should escape prosecution. The
public is rightly angered when executives evade accountability for their
organization’s crimes, seemingly as a matter of course. 65 The reasons this
happens are complex, 66 but we must strive to overcome them. Prosecutors
can and should investigate charges against both corporations and implicated
individual employees for any business crime. 67 Indeed, this is already the
Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) stated goal. 68 Holding culpable employees
accountable is an essential component of any comprehensive strategy for
addressing corporate crime. 69
Lastly, in arguing that the criminal law should excuse some corporate
conduct, I do not mean to minimize the significant harms that corporate
62F

63F

64F

65F

66F

67F

68F

69F

62

See, e.g., Diamantis, supra note 7, at 2058–67.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
64
MARTIN BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW § 8:1 (5th ed.
2019), Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2019).
65
See Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail, NEW YORKER (July 24,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/31/why-corrupt-bankers-avoid-jail
[https://perma.cc/PZ8M-J6F2].
66
See generally SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE (2016) (discussing factors that lead to leniency
in prosecuting corporate crime).
67
It should be born in mind that sometimes when corporations misbehave there will be no
culpable employees. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate
Crime: An Economic Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL
LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 11, 16 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow
eds., 2011); see also United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 847–48 (1st Cir.
1987) (convicting corporation despite prior acquittal of all involved employees).
68
Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Individual
Accountability
for
Corporate
Wrongdoing
(Sept.
9,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download (requiring line prosecutors to
gather all information about culpable individuals before settling charges against corporations)
[https://perma.cc/WFA9-28JL].
69
See, e.g., Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 17–18, 28–
29 (2019) (“[D]eterring corporate crime requires deterring individual employees from
committing crime on the corporation’s behalf.”).
63
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crime, excused or not, inflicts on its victims. “Excuse defenses . . . do not
turn unacceptable behavior into permissible conduct.” 70 To the contrary, as I
argue below, the corporate insanity defense is more victim-affirming than
current approaches to sanctioning dysfunctional corporate misconduct. I
have previously called on lawmakers and scholars to pay more attention to
victims when designing corporate enforcement priorities. 71 Federal criminal
law and sentencing guidelines rightly give primacy of place to making
victims whole. 72 I mean nothing I say here to diminish the law’s
responsibility for ensuring that corporations compensate their victims, even
for misconduct that the criminal law may ultimately excuse. As courts have
emphasized, victim restitution serves essentially civil rather than criminal
functions. 73 An intricate civil liability regime runs parallel to most of
corporate criminal law. 74 There is no general insanity defense to civil
liability, nor should there be. 75
Even with this clarification, three foundational objections to the
corporate insanity defense must be set aside as beyond the scope of my
argument. In the remainder of this Part, I hope to show that, whatever their
philosophical merits, these objections have unacceptable legal, policy, and
strategic implications.
70F

71F

72F

73F

74F

75F

70

ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173(a).
Mihailis E. Diamantis & William S. Laufer, Prosecution and Punishment of Corporate
Criminality, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 453, 454 (2019) (“In the absence of a corporate
victimology, there is a far greater likelihood that criminal justice priorities, resources, and
expenditures will be mismeasured.”).
72
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (mandating restitution orders in criminal cases); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.1(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (requiring
courts sentencing corporations to order victim restitution and to prioritize payment of
restitution over payment of fines).
73
See United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Functionally, the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a tort statute . . . .”).
74
See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1327–28 (2001) (“Parallel statutory regimes providing civil
and criminal sanctions for essentially the same conduct exist in virtually every area of whitecollar wrongdoing, including health care fraud, environmental harms, workplace safety, and
securities law.”).
75
See William E. Westerbeke, Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part II, 50 U. KAN. L. REV.
225, 225 (2002) (referring to “the unanimous American rule that insanity does not prevent the
existence of an intent for purposes of civil liability”); Victoria O’Brien, Civil Legal Remedies
for Crime Victims, OVC BULL. (Dec. 1993), https://booksite.elsevier.com/9780323287654/
content/CH5-OVC_Civil_remedies.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX35-GA2Q].
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The first objection rejects any notion that excuses can apply to corporate
misconduct. 76 Excuses function by negating moral accountability for harm. 77
If corporations are necessarily morally unaccountable, excuses do not
apply. 78 Philosopher Susan Wolf has compared corporations to sociopaths,
whom she believes lack moral standing. 79 If corporations are not responsible
agents, they can have no responsibility to excuse, whether by the insanity
defense or otherwise.
Whether the objection assumes that corporations are not moral agents
because they cannot truly act, or because they can act but not responsibly, 80
this is a dangerous path to go down. It threatens to unravel all corporate
criminal law. The Supreme Court recognized more than a century ago that
the law must hold corporations criminally accountable if it is to have
effective tools for controlling corporate harm. 81 Undoing corporate criminal
law would leave the public vulnerable to corporate villainy. It would also risk
76F

77F

78F

79F

80F

81F

76
See Sylvia Rich, Can Corporations Experience Duress? An Examination of EmotionBased Excuses and Group Agents, 13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 149, 149–50 (2019) (“It seems unlikely
that a corporate entity could benefit from such human-specific defenses as insanity or lack of
capacity.”). Interestingly, Rich argues that corporations could benefit from a duress defense.
Id. at 150.
77
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, supra note 15, at 221 (“Excuses admit that the deed
may be wrong, but excuse the actor because conditions suggest that the actor is not responsible
for his deed.”).
78
See C.M.V. Clarkson, Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls, 59 MOD.
L. REV. 557, 566 (1996) (“Culpability can only be attributed to moral agents and many
commentators have argued that companies, for these purposes, cannot be culpability-bearing
agents in their own right.”).
79
Susan Wolf, The Legal and Moral Responsibility of Organizations, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII, 267, 278–81 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985);
see also Amy J. Sepinwall, Blame, Emotions, and the Corporation, in THE MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 143, 144–63 (Eric W. Orts & N. Craig Smith eds., 2017) (arguing
since corporations do not have emotions, they cannot be morally responsible).
80
See 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615 Insanity Defense § 14, Westlaw (database
updated Sept. 2020) (“Automatism is a defense closely related to unconsciousness. A person
in a state of automatism, while capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing. Such a
person may perform complex actions without intent, exercise of will, or knowledge of the act.
Automatistic behavior is frequently followed by a partial or complete inability to recall the
actions performed while unconscious.”); Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the
Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1572–73 (1980) (arguing that an unconscious person
cannot be responsible for his acts); People v. Ray, 533 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Cal. 1975) (noting
that involuntary unconsciousness is a full defense to criminal charges).
81
N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) (“We see
no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation [should be
held criminally accountable] . . . .”); see generally Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function
of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473 (2006) (arguing that the criminal law has uniquely
powerful deterrent effects for corporations).
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undermining the broader legitimacy and efficacy of criminal law. 82 The
concept of corporate responsibility is an ingrained and intuitive fixture of our
social lives. 83 Perceptions of corporate agency and responsibility are
hardwired into our cognitive architecture. 84 If the criminal law refuses to
hold corporations accountable, it risks undermining its perceived moral
authority. In any case, given the broad public support for punishing
corporations, abolishing corporate criminal law is a political nonstarter. 85
A second objection to the corporate insanity defense says that
corporations cannot be insane because they do not have minds. 86 This
objection has even further-reaching abolitionist implications than the first. A
foundational premise of corporate law is the fiction that corporations have
mental states. 87 While “the corporate personality is a [legal] fiction, [it is] a
fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact.” 88 Regardless of
whether corporations really have minds, there are compelling reasons for the
pretense. 89 Without that fiction, corporations could not take the many legal
actions that make them so useful, like entering into contracts, buying
property, selling goods, etc. It is hornbook law that without a “meeting of the
minds” there can be no contract. 90 Furthermore, abandoning the fiction that
82F

83F

84F

85F

86F

87F

88F

89F

90F
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PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 176–88 (2013)
(“[T]he criminal law’s moral credibility is essential to effective crime control . . . .”).
83
Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz, Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies, 7
PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 67, 71–72 (2008); Matthew J. O’Laughlin & Bertram F.
Malle, How People Explain Actions Performed by Groups and Individuals, 82 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 33, 33 (2002).
84
Diamantis, supra note 7, at 2077–80; Steven J. Sherman & Elise J. Percy, The
Psychology of Collective Responsibility: When and Why Collective Entities Are Likely To Be
Held Responsible for the Misdeeds of Individual Members, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 137, 150 (2010);
Amy L. Johnson & Sarah Queller, The Mental Representations of High and Low Entitativity
Groups, 21 SOC. COGNITION 101, 112 (2003) (providing evidence of a basic shift in cognition
toward groups with high versus low entitativity).
85
See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 612 (2012) (arguing
that the public demands corporate criminal liability). But see John Hasnas, The Centenary of
a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329,
1329 (2009) (arguing against corporate criminal liability).
86
See John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal
Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 350 (2004).
87
See generally Diamantis, supra note 7 (discussing criminal law’s commitment to
corporate mental states).
88
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
89
See generally CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY,
DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS (2011) (arguing that corporations are agents).
But see generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (arguing that corporations are not
agents).
90
Insurance Company v. Young’s Administrator, 90 U.S. 85, 107 (1874).
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corporations have minds would effectively immunize corporations from most
significant forms of liability. 91 The vast majority of crimes require both a
criminal act and a criminal mental state. 92 No mind, no mens rea, no crime.
Finally, I set aside (at least until Part V) a third class of objections
because of their close kinship to a destructive and mistaken mythology that
opponents of the insanity defense have recited for decades. 93 Unsubstantiated
criticisms of the insanity defense include that it allows criminals to “beat the
wrap,” 94 involves arbitrary line-drawing, 95 is too vague, 96 is too widely
used, 97 releases dangerous criminals back into the public, 98 and is a “rich
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93F

94F

97F
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96F
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91
See Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Extended Corporate Mind: When Corporations Use AI
to Break the Law, 98 N.C. L. REV. 893, 899 (2020) (discussing the implications of not having
a doctrine for attributing mental states to corporations when they act through algorithmic
rather than employees).
92
United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) (“In the criminal law, both a
culpable mens rea and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur.”).
93
See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 604 (1989) (“I begin the process of
unpacking the myths by focusing on a series of meta-myths that have developed around the
empirical myths: myths animated by an omnipresent fear of feigning, by a community sense
that mental illness is somehow different from other illnesses, by a public need for mentally
disabled criminal defendants to conform to certain typical external manifestations of
‘craziness,’ and by a persistent belief that it is simply improper to exculpate most criminal
defendants because of their mental illness.”).
94
Linda C. Fentiman, “Guilty But Mentally Ill”: The Real Verdict Is Guilty, 26 B.C. L.
REV. 601, 601–02 (1985) (“Although the insanity defense is invoked in far less than one
percent of all felony cases, and is successful in only a fraction of the cases in which it is
invoked, the view is widely held that the insanity defense is used to ‘coddle’ criminals and to
permit guilty and violent individuals to escape the criminal sanction.”).
95
Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 864–65 (Ala. 1887) (“It is no satisfactory objection to say
that the rule above announced by us is of difficult application. The rule in McNaghten’s Case
is equally obnoxious to a like criticism. The difficulty does not lie in the rule, but is inherent
in the subject of insanity itself.”) (citation omitted).
96
1 NAT’L COMM. ON REFORM OF FED. CRIM. LAWS, WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 249 (1970) (noting the key terms in the
various insanity tests are so vague that they “invite semantic jousting, metaphysical
speculation, intuitive moral judgments in the guise of factual determinations”).
97
William S. Laufer, The Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 453,
454 (1995) (reviewing MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
(1994)) (“Myth 1[:] The insanity defense is overused.”).
98
Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both
Succeeded in Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity
Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 972–75 (1987) (“One of the most palpable bases for public
distrust of the insanity defense is the widespread fear that defendants found NGRI are quickly
released from mental hospitals to commit new crimes against society.”).
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man’s” defense. 99 I assume, along with most criminal law professors, that
the insanity defense for individuals is desirable and that we should dismiss
these myths. 100
For individual defendants, the data belie the naysayers’ story.
Defendants rarely feign mental illness. 101 Indeed, defendants are more likely
to feign sanity than insanity. 102 The insanity defense is pled in only 0.9% of
cases and is successful in only 0.2%. 103 Criminal defendants whom courts
find to be insane are rarely set free. In the vast majority of cases, they face
commitment to a mental institution, 104 often for longer than the prison
sentence they would have faced upon conviction. 105 Lastly, the rich are no
more likely to benefit from the defense than the poor. 106
These data are, of course, all about individuals asserting the insanity
defense. There is no such data about corporations. In its absence, we should
resist unfounded speculation. Allowing this sort of criticism to creep in too
99F
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102F

103F

104F
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106F
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Morse, supra note 27, at 798–99 (“It is also often claimed that insanity is a rich person’s
defense—the Hinckley verdict is a particularly popular example—but this claim proves too
much. Wealthier defendants can almost always retain the best attorneys and experts in all types
of cases, both civil and criminal.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(d)
(3d ed. 2019), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2019) (“Insanity is in practice only a ‘rich
man’s defense’ in that only the wealthy can afford the array of experts needed to mount a
convincing defense—experts who are in short supply and whose time would be better spent
in treatment of those who have been committed or imprisoned.”).
100
See Brief of Amicus Curiae 290 Criminal Law and Mental Health Professors in
Support of Petitioner’s Request for Reversal and Remand at 3, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct.
1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135) (arguing that abolishing insanity defense is unconstitutional). But
see Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1243–46 (2000) (arguing for abolition).
101
Robert M. Wettstein & Edward P. Mulvey, Disposition of Insanity Acquittees in
Illinois, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 11, 15 (1988) (reporting very low rates of
malingering about insanity).
102
See Dorothy Otnow Lewis, Jonathan H. Pincus, Marilyn Feldman, Lori Jackson &
Barbara Bard, Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death
Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 841 (1986).
103
HENRY J. STEADMAN, MARGARET A. MCGREEVY, JOSEPH P. MORRISSEY, LISA A.
CALLAHAN, PAMELA CLARK ROBBINS & CARMEN CIRINCIONE, BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY:
EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 28 (1993); see Morse, supra note 27, at 797 (“Few
defendants ‘beat the rap’ with the insanity defense. There are little hard data for this claim,
but it is best estimated that the insanity defense is raised in fewer than two percent of federal
and state trials and is rarely successful.”).
104
LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 8.4.
105
Mac McClelland, When ‘Not Guilty’ Is a Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 27,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/magazine/when-not-guilty-is-a-lifesentence.html [https://perma.cc/L7CM-L6L4] (“[Insanity acquittees] often lost their freedom
for twice as long as those actually convicted of the same offense.”).
106
See Michael R. Hawkins & Richard A. Pasewark, Characteristics of Persons Utilizing
the Insanity Plea, 53 PSYCH. REP. 191, 194 (1983).
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early could have unwelcome implications for the insanity defense more
broadly. Selective news reporting largely informs the public’s skeptical
perceptions of the insanity defense 107 and is “fueled by the supposed
invisibility of mental illness.” 108 We should resist fanning the flames.
107F

108F

II. MEASURING MADNESS
The criminal law presumes that we are all sane and responsible for our
actions. 109 It is on that basis that we can be punished when we commit
crimes. The insanity defense, though, is criminal law’s acknowledgement
that this presumption can be overcome. Mental impairment may cause moral
impairment, and moral impairment may make punishment inappropriate. 110
The defense is “the law’s conscientious efforts to place in a separate category
people who cannot justly be held ‘responsible’ for their acts.” 111
Public opinion has contributed more to the history of the insanity
defense than has the reasoned march of scientific progress. 112 Though
contemporary Americans tend to be highly skeptical of the defense, 113 it has
long been a fixture of criminal law. There is some debate about the defense’s
true origins. 114 Most scholars trace it to ancient Greek, Roman, or Hebrew
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113F

114F
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See NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, MYTHS AND REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 5 (1983).
108
Perlin, supra note 93, at 721.
109
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006) (“The presumption of sanity is equally
universal . . . being (at least) a presumption that a defendant has the capacity to form the mens
rea necessary for a verdict of guilt and the consequent criminal responsibility.”); Slobogin,
supra note 100, at 1202 (“Accepting blameworthiness as the touchstone of the criminal law
means that individual culpability must be assessed. That is where the kind of inquiry the
insanity defense mandates comes into play. It is meant to help us decide who among those
who commit criminal acts deserve to be the subject of criminal punishment.”).
110
LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(d) (“[W]e would rebel at the notion of labeling as
criminal those who are generally conceded not to be blameworthy.”).
111
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966).
112
Loren H. Roth, Preserve but Limit the Insanity Defense, 58 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 91, 91
(1986–87) (“The evolution of the insanity defense over the centuries cannot be viewed as a
march of scientific progress, but instead as a barometer of public and jurisprudential thinking
about justice.”).
113
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS § 3:3, Westlaw
(database updated May 2020) (“Despite society’s tacit acceptance of insanity as a disease in
the medical realm of diagnosis and treatment, society has not been predisposed to extend the
illness model to the legal forum.”); Mickenberg, supra note 98, at 965 (“Virtually every
relevant survey reveals a deep-seated public antipathy to the NGRI verdict.”).
114
See Debra Wood, Ancient Origins – or Otherwise – of the Insanity Defense, 16
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCH. & L. S145, S150–51 (2009) (arguing, contrary to common scholarly
assertion, that ancient Greek law had no insanity defense).
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law. 115 From there, the insanity defense found its way to medieval British
law, 116 where it was a well-established part of the common law by the end of
the Middle Ages. 117
Although the central insight of the insanity defense has always been that
mental impairment can negate moral responsibility, the doctrinal test for
mental impairment has changed over time. Early English legal commentators
noted the defense’s existence, but there are few direct textual records of the
legal standards courts used. 118 One of the first—the “wild beast” test—comes
from the early 18th century. 119 Edward Arnold was charged with the
attempted murder of Lord Thomas Onslow in 1724. 120 Arnold had shot
Onslow in front of two witnesses. 121 There were several signs that things
were not quite right with Arnold: he would hoot like an owl, put hot coals in
his father’s food, and complain that Lord Onslow was living inside his
belly. 122 The judge instructed the jury that “a man that is totally deprived of
his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more
than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of
punishment.” 123 Though the jury convicted Arnold and the judge sentenced
him to death, Lord Onslow interceded so that the punishment was reduced to
life imprisonment. 124
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RUDOLPH JOSEPH GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 8 (1984); ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 33 (W. D. Ross trans., Batoche Books 1999) (“Since virtue is
concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary passions and actions praise and blame
are bestowed, on those that are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the
voluntary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are studying the nature
of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of honours and of
punishments.”).
116
Slobogin, supra note 100, at 1208 (“Although we have virtually no direct evidence
about the facts of individual cases in medieval and renaissance times, commentators of the
period consistently spoke of a requirement that the defendant lack understanding of good and
evil or be devoid of all reason, and often equated the insane with animals or infants.”).
117
Sheila Hafter Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary
Relevance, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 559, 562 (1972).
118
See Homer D. Crotty, The History of Insanity as a Defense to Crime in English
Criminal Law, 12 CAL. L. REV. 105, 107–14 (1923–24).
119
See generally Anthony M. Platt, The Origins and Development of the “Wild Beast”
Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 ISSUES IN
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1965) (describing the historical origins of the wild beast test).
120
R v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 695 (Eng. 1724).
121
Id. at 699–700.
122
Id. at 733–34, 725–26, 731–32.
123
Id. at 765.
124
Id. at 765–66.
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The modern doctrinal history of the insanity defense began more than a
century later, in 1843, with M’Naghten. 125 M’Naghten shot and killed the
Prime Minister’s secretary, mistaking him for the Prime Minister. 126 In his
defense, M’Naghten explained that the Prime Minister had been
orchestrating a vast political conspiracy to kill him. 127 Mental health experts
testified that M’Naghten suffered from paranoid delusions. 128 The judge
accordingly instructed the jury on the insanity defense, setting forth what is,
to this day, the best known insanity standard: any defendant who, at the time
of his crime, was “labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of
mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing: or if he
did ‘know’ it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong,” is legally
insane. 129 The jury found M’Naghten “not guilty, by reason of insanity.” 130
He lived out his days between the “criminal lunatic department” at Bedlam
Hospital and the Broadmoor Asylum. 131
Though tests measuring insanity by the defendant’s inability to
distinguish “right and wrong” existed since the early 1800s, 132 the
“M’Naghten test” quickly became the standard throughout England. 133 Soon
after, it migrated to the United States. By the middle of the 19th century, U.S.
federal courts and many state courts had adopted the M’Naghten test. 134
Before long, many became most. 135
The insanity defense’s history did not stabilize with the M’Naghten test.
Following a slew of scholarly challenges to the test during the 1950s, the
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DANIEL W. SHUMAN, PSYCHIATRIC
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PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE § 12:2 (3d ed.

2018).
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M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (1843).
RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL
MCNAUGHTAN 1 (1981).
128
M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719.
129
Id. at 722.
130
MORAN, supra note 127, at 19.
131
Id. at 23–24.
132
Slobogin, supra note 100, at 1209 (“Beginning no later than the early 1800s, courts in
both England and America increasingly referred to insanity as an inability to distinguish ‘right
and wrong.’ This language conld [sic] be construed to mean that a person who intentionally
harmed another and was generally aware of the concept of crime might still be acquitted if,
because of mental disorder, he . . . delusionally perceived facts that amounted to a
justification.”).
133
See MORAN, supra note 127, at 2.
134
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 113, § 3:7.
135
See Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the “Right and Wrong” Test
of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical
Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1257 (1966).
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release of the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) own test in 1962, 136 and the
passage of the federal Insanity Defense Reform Act in 1984, 137 the picture
in the United States is much more complicated today. States have substantial
leeway to shape their own tests, giving rise to a patchwork of different
approaches. 138 While five states—Alaska, 139 Idaho, 140 Kansas, 141
Montana, 142 and Utah 143—have abolished the defense, the remaining
jurisdictions allow some combination of so-called “cognitive” and
“volitional” tests. 144
Volitional tests are premised on the assumption that a defendant must
have control of his actions to be responsible for them. Control serves as a
constraint on liability throughout the criminal law. For example, criminal
liability generally requires that a person acted voluntarily. 145 The duress
excuse similarly recognizes that certain circumstances—e.g., coercion by
another’s use of unlawful force 146—can impair control and render a person
blameless. 147 Volitional insanity tests provide an excuse when a mental
136F
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MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962).
18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
138
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 742 (2006) (rejecting challenge to Arizona’s particular
formulation of the insanity defense).
139
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (Westlaw through 2020 Sec. Reg. Sess.).
140
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (Westlaw through 2020 Sec. Reg. & First Extra. Sess.).
141
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (Westlaw through 2020 Reg. & Special Sess.).
142
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (Westlaw through 2019 Sess.).
143
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Westlaw through 2020 Fifth Special Sess.).
144
The Supreme Court distinguishes four types of test for the insanity defense: cognitive,
moral, volitional, and product-of-mental-illness. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006)
(“The main variants are the cognitive incapacity, the moral incapacity, the volitional
incapacity, and the product-of-mental-illness tests.”). To streamline the argument, I focus the
most common cognitive and volitional tests. Commentators often collapse the cognitive and
moral tests, see, e.g., id. at 737, 753 (“[C]ognitive incapacity is itself enough to demonstrate
moral incapacity . . . . Cognitive incapacity, in other words, is a sufficient condition for
establishing a defense of insanity, albeit not a necessary one.”), and only New Hampshire uses
the product-of-mental-illness test. Id. at 751.
145
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019) (“A person is not guilty of an
offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act of which he is physically capable.”).
146
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019) (“It is an affirmative defense that
the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to
do so by the use of . . . unlawful force against his person . . . that a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”).
147
ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173(e)(1) (“These
claims of impairment of control are not unique to the insanity defense. The duress defense
recognizes that even normal persons, those who suffer no mental illness, may blamelessly fail
to resist coercive forces compelling their criminal conduct.”).
137
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disease or defect sufficiently impairs a defendant’s control over a criminal
act.
Since the M’Naghten test was so influential and lacked a volitional
component, volitional tests for insanity were rare 148 until relatively
recently. 149 By the mid-20th century, most U.S. jurisdictions had adopted
some form of a volitional test. 150 The most common formulation applied if a
defendant experienced an “irresistible impulse” to engage in the underlying
criminal conduct. 151 Commentators criticized the starkly binary nature of
that formulation of the test, which presumes that an impulse is either
resistible or not. 152 Accordingly, during the 1960s and ‘70s, many states
turned to the ALI’s more nuanced version, 153 according to which a defendant
is legally insane if he “lack[ed] substantial capacity . . . to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.” 154 By the early 1980s, every federal
court to have considered the issue had also adopted a volitional test. 155
The volitional test’s dominance was short-lived. In 1982, John Hinkley
attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan. 156 During his federal
criminal trial, he raised the volitional prong of the insanity defense. He
argued that his obsession with actress Jodi Foster deprived him of control
over his actions. 157 After Foster ignored his many letters, he felt compelled
to assassinate the President to grab her attention and win her esteem. 158 The
jury bought it. 159 His acquittal provoked national outrage and prompted
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See Edwin R. Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U.
PA. L. REV. 956, 961–65 (1952) (“After M’Naghten, English trial judges in charging juries
generally employed the test of ‘knowledge of right and wrong’ and, when the question arose,
declared that irresistible impulse was not a defense.”). They did exist in Britain and the United
States, though they were more rarely invoked. See Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight
and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1,
11–18 (1988) (discussing limited use of the volitional test for insanity in early 20th century
American and U.K. courts).
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Some historians question whether the M’Naghten court actually intended to abolish the
volitional test. Crotty, supra note 118, at 118.
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E.g., Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Met. 500, 502 (Mass. 1844).
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See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
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See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J.
194, 196 (1983).
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SHUMAN, supra note 125, § 12:2.
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MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
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English, supra note 148, at 45.
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United States v. Hinckley, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2016).
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See PETER W. LOW, JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR. & RICHARD J. BONNIE, THE TRIAL OF
JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE 22–27 (1986).
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Hinckley, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 3.
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Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater, John Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The
Public’s Verdict, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 202, 202 (1983).
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reflection. 160 During the ensuing backlash against the volitional test, all but
eighteen states and the District of Columbia abrogated it. 161
Critics of the volitional test worry that it is so imprecise that it is
virtually meaningless. All people feel urges, and all people have choices. 162
So, why should we excuse some people’s urges? As the American Psychiatric
Association put it: “The line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse
not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk.” 163
Many think psychology has little to add to this commonsense refrain: “There
is no scientific measure of the strength of urges.” 164 However, some
psychologists today are more optimistic that recent advances in neuroscience
and clinical research can help. 165 Although these developments may not yet
offer a numerical measure of control, they at least show that the capacity for
control is no more difficult to assess than the cognitive capacities that other
formulations of the insanity defense reference. 166
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Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 577 (1994) (“The acquittal of John Hinckley
on all charges stemming from his attempt on President Reagan’s life, coupled with the ensuing
public focus on the insanity defense, prompted Congress to undertake a comprehensive
overhaul of the insanity defense as it operated in the federal courts. The result of this effort
was the IDRA.”); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. 17,
Providing For Insanity Defense in Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 118 A.L.R. FED. 265
(1994) (“As one of the responses to public pressure surrounding the use of the insanity defense
in the prosecution of John Hinckley for the attempted assassination of President Reagan,
Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984.”); STEPHEN E. ARTHUR & ROBERT
S. HUNTER, 1 FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK: CRIMINAL § 12:18 (4th ed. 2018), Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2020) (“The [Insanity Defense Reform Act] thus eliminated the
volitional prong of the defense; prior to the act, a defendant could assert a valid defense if he
were unable to appreciate the nature of his act or unable to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.”).
161
Redding, supra note 49, at 85.
162
Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592, 1599–1602
(1994).
163
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 228 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3410.
164
Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health
Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 584 (1978); see also S. REP. NO. 98-225 at 227 (1983), as
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3408–09 (quoting Professor Richard Bonnie) (“There
is, in short, no objective basis for distinguishing between offenders who were undeterrable
and those who were merely undeterred, between the impulse that was irresistible and the
impulse not resisted, or between substantial impairment of capacity and some lesser
impairment.”).
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Redding, supra note 49, at 90.
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Id. at 104–05 (“[T]he availability of control tests should not turn on how satisfactorily
we can measure control . . . . In practice, however, determining whether a defendant’s
delusions or hallucinations were directly responsible for the criminal conduct, and whether
they distorted the defendant’s perceptions of legal or moral wrongfulness to the degree that he
or she should not be held criminally responsible, also poses significant line-drawing
problems.”).

2021]

THE CORPORATE INSANITY DEFENSE

25

After discarding the volitional test, most states and the federal system
only have a cognitive test for insanity. 167 Cognitive tests roughly say that a
defendant may be excused if he was unable to understand his conduct in some
important respect. 168 “To qualify as a blameworthy moral agent,” the thought
behind cognitive tests goes, “[an] individual must have the capacity to make
moral judgments about what to do and how to be.” 169 The best-known
formulation of the cognitive test is the M’Naghten standard quoted above,
and many states still subscribe to it today. 170 Federal law is similar and
applies if a defendant is “unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts.” 171 However, like the irresistible impulse test for
control, M’Naghten’s requirement that a defendant lack all knowledge about
the nature and quality of his actions is binary. “The M’Naghten rules
fruitlessly attempt to relieve from punishment only those mentally diseased
persons who have no cognitive capacity . . . . This formula does not comport
with modern medical knowledge that an individual is a mentally complex
being with varying degrees of awareness.” 172 Accordingly, the ALI’s test
avoids the all-or-nothing language of M’Naghten and replaces it with a less
stringent standard referring to “substantial capacity”: 173 “A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lack[ed] substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the
criminality his conduct.” 174 Roughly half the states use the ALI’s version. 175
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Id. at 85. It should be noted that some commentators believe that the cognitive test
implicitly includes the volitional test as well. See PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 113, § 3.9 (“The Committee that created the test and prepared
the accompanying commentary believed that the cognitive aspect of the test in essence
encompassed the volitional aspect.”).
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Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 747 (2006).
169
Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1518 (1992) (emphasis
omitted).
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See Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 61–
62 (2005).
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18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
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Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 66 (9th Cir. 1970).
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United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
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Michelle Migdal Gee, Annotation, Modern Status of Test of Criminal Responsibility—
State Cases, 9 A.L.R.4th 526 § 2[a] (1981) (“The ALI [cognitive] test, either in its proposed
official form or with some omissions, substitutions, or other variations, has now been adopted
by over half of the jurisdictions in the United States.”) (internal cross-references omitted). The
following states have adopted the ALI cognitive test without revisions: Alabama, Alaska,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. § 5.
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The cognitive test’s critics point out that there are mental illnesses that
leave a person cognitively intact but nonetheless deprive him of
responsibility. 176 For example, “[a] person who knew what he was doing was
wrong, but who felt ‘compelled’ to commit the criminal act—say, a person
suffering from kleptomania or manic-depressive psychosis—would be
criminally punished [under a cognitive standard].” 177 The significant
advantage of cognitive tests is supposed to be that, unlike volitional tests,
they are more amenable to psychiatric analysis. 178 It is unclear, though,
whether this is true. 179 Regardless, it is also far from obvious that introducing
more psychiatric analysis into the courtroom is a good thing, since it may
distract from what the insanity defense is really about. “[T]he insanity
defense’s biggest problem is that it has been ‘over-scienced.’ In the
end . . . legal insanity is a legal and moral policy judgment, not a particular
empirical fact.” 180
Moral considerations have dominated the history of justification and
critique of the insanity defense in both its formulations. 181 “[M]inimal
rationality (a cognitive capacity) and minimal self-control or lack of
compulsion (a volitional capacity) are the essential preconditions for
responsibility.” 182 The moral case shows how both tests for insanity promote
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Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 857 (Ala. 1887) (“[A]s it was soon discovered that insanity
often existed without delusions, as well as delusions without insanity, this view was also
abandoned.”).
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Slobogin, supra note 100, 1210–12; see also United States v. Emery, 682 F.2d 493,
497–99 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (“It will
justify a verdict of acquittal that his reasoning powers were so far dethroned by his diseased
mental condition as to deprive him of the will power to resist the insane impulse to perpetrate
the deed, though knowing it to be wrong.”).
178
Jonathan B. Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined, 94 YALE L.J.
1545, 1555 (1985) (reviewing LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF
JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. (1984)) (“By eliminating the ‘volitional’ element of the defense and
placing new evidentiary restrictions on psychiatric testimony, Congress indicated a desire to
recognize the limits of psychiatric expertise.”).
179
See Julie E. Grachek, Note, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How
Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479,
1493 (2006) (“Therefore, exclusive use of cognitive ability to determine insanity may also
disregard the existence of free will because cognitive tests do not recognize the role of the
unconscious mind.”); Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory
of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1410–13 (1986)
(providing psychiatrists’ testimony in various cases highlighting the significant volitional
component, in relation to the cognitive component, of a defendant’s condition).
180
Morse & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 1119.
181
See generally Arenella, supra note 169 (discussing the moral basis of the insanity
defense). See also Bonnie, supra note 152, at 196.
182
Morse, supra note 27, at 782.
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criminal law’s retributive goal, i.e., to give criminals what they deserve. 183
A person who is not responsible for a crime deserves no punishment for it. 184
The full modern case for the insanity defense rests on showing how it
also promotes the other three major justifications for criminal punishment:
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 185 I address each in turn.
Deterrence is effectively an economic theory of criminal law. 186 It views both
would-be and actual criminals as rational actors who try to maximize benefits
and minimize costs. 187 On this theory, the goal of criminal law is to prevent
crime by increasing the expected costs of criminal mischief. 188 Criminal law
does this by imposing punishment when crime is discovered. 189 The law
hopes both to deter the criminal himself from reoffending (specific
deterrence) and to deter other would-be criminals (general deterrence) by
displaying the legal consequences of misconduct. 190
The logic of deterrence seems to require punishment for all criminals;
however, this is not necessarily the case for volitionally- or cognitivelyimpaired offenders. 191 As to general deterrence, most would-be criminals are
unlikely to identify with insane offenders. 192 If people do not see themselves
as potentially standing in a defendant’s shoes, facing the same punishment,
they will draw no implications for their own conduct. As to specific
183F
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See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (John Ladd trans.,

1999).
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Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER
EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,
1987) (“Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those
who receive it.”).
185
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003).
186
See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (offering an economic account of criminal deterrence).
187
See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 67, at 14 (describing “the lens of an economic
model in which corporate crime is the outcome of decisions of utility-maximizing individuals
who have the ability to incur criminal liability on behalf of the corporation”).
188
Id. at 11 (“The threat of sanction is central to the deterrence of corporate crime . . . .”).
189
Id. at 14–15 (“Within this rational-choice ‘deterrence’ framework, individuals weigh
the costs and benefits of crime-related activity against the expected sanction to maximize their
private utility under the constraints of the organization in which they find themselves.”).
190
Deterrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
191
41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615, supra note 80, § 1 (“A person who suffers from
a mental disorder is deprived of this capacity; he is neither culpable nor capable of being
deterred and is therefore not subjected to the same penalties as are others who are sane.”).
192
LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c)(4); LeBlanc, supra note 56, at 1318 (“Deterrence is
effective only if people view the lessons of the offender as applicable to them, which is likely
if they can identify with the offender and the circumstances of the offense. A sane person is
unlikely to identify with an insane offender or the offending situation, and thus is not
susceptible to the deterrent effect of punishing the insane.”).
AND
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deterrence, “[t]hose who are substantially unable to restrain their conduct are,
by definition, undeterrable.” 193 Criminals must have some control over their
conduct if the sort of cost–benefit calculus at the heart of deterrence theory
is to have any effect. They must also be able to understand which courses of
conduct will trigger criminal sanction. Insane defendants who fail the
cognitive test lack that capacity, and they will not acquire it through
punishment. 194
Rehabilitation and incapacitation also favor excusing the criminally
insane. Prisons are poorly suited for people with mental illness. Since they
typically lack adequate mental health facilities, prisons are incapable of
treating or rehabilitating insane inmates. 195 Nor does locking up mentally ill
criminals incapacitate them from harming others. It just relocates their
destructive behavior from the general public to the prison population, where
criminal activity resumes. 196 Inexpert treatment at prison facilities often
works against any rehabilitative ambitions by exacerbating mental illness. 197
The better approach, so far as rehabilitation and incapacitation are concerned,
is to keep mentally ill criminals out of prison and keep them in mental health
facilities, which are best equipped to treat and (as necessary) restrain them. 198
To summarize, there are two general legal tests for insanity. Volitional
tests require that the defendant lacked the (substantial) capacity to control his
behavior. Cognitive tests require that the defendant lacked the (substantial)
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Although there are
jurisdictional variations in the phrasing of the tests, nothing below will turn
on precise wording. The criminal justice case for either test turns on its ability
to distinguish sane criminals—whose punishment promotes retribution,
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United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966).
See LeBlanc, supra note 56, at 1318 (“It is the same mental disease that causes an
insane offender’s criminal conduct, which also makes that offender incapable of
understanding or learning from the punishment of others.”).
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See Freeman, 357 F.2d at 615 (“What rehabilitative function is served when one who
is mentally incompetent and found guilty is ordered to serve a sentence in prison? Is not any
curative or restorative function better achieved in such a case in an institution designed and
equipped to treat just such individuals?”).
196
W. Robert Thomas, Incapacitating Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L. REV. 905, 937
(2019) (“[I]mprisonment protects the broader population from future wrongdoing by
ostensibly dangerous persons. This protection, however, does not extend to the prison
population—prisoners are of course still able to commit crimes while in prison.”).
197
See, e.g., Grant T. Harris, Tracey A. Skilling & Marnie E. Rice, The Construct of
Psychopathy, 28 CRIME & JUST. 197, 235 (2001) (“[T]reatments that benefit other offenders
actually harm psychopaths . . . .”).
198
LeBlanc, supra note 56, at 1321 (“A better approach for protecting society is to provide
an affirmative insanity defense, thereby assuring that insane individuals acquitted of crimes
will be committed to psychiatric institutions until their dangerous propensities subside.”).
194
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deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation—from insane criminals—
whose punishment does not further those ends.
To justify extending the insanity defense to corporations with
“volitional” or “cognitive” deficits, I ultimately need to argue that punishing
such corporations conflicts with the four basic purposes of criminal law.
First, though, I must show that corporations can satisfy the volitional and
cognitive tests for insanity. That will require some background from
corporate law, psychology, organizational science, and economics on the
sorts of pathologies that can affect corporations. I turn to that background
next.
III. LEGALLY INSANE CORPORATIONS
If, as the law presupposes, corporations have minds, can those minds be
disordered in ways that meet the insanity defense’s requirements? State and
federal law codify the insanity defense, so presumably statutory text and
purpose should dictate the answer. Nothing in the statutory language
excludes corporate defendants. The law opens the defense to any “person” 199
or “defendant,” 200 terms that include corporations.
The muddier issue is whether corporations can ever satisfy the elements
of the defense. “Insanity” is a legal term. If the law defined “insanity” in
terms of organic brain abnormalities, corporations would be disqualified
automatically. As explained in the previous Part, the law takes a different
approach, characterizing insanity as a defect that sufficiently inhibits volition
or cognition. While corporations may not initially seem to have volition or
cognition any more than they have organic brains, those concepts have a
specific understanding within the context of the insanity defense. On that
understanding, there are organizational features that are intuitively
compelling corporate equivalents of volition and cognition. There are
organizational defects that can inhibit them. These include rogue employees
who commit isolated, self-serving crimes (discussed in Part III.A) and
corporate cultures so defective that they distorts employees’ capacity to
reason ethically (discussed in Part III.B). As argued below, corporations with
these conditions would satisfy the statutory requirements under volitional
and cognitive tests, respectively. Recognizing a defense for them would
advance the basic goals of criminal justice.
199F
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A. SATISFYING THE VOLITIONAL TEST

It may at first sound like a conceptual mistake to suggest that
corporations can satisfy the volitional test for insanity. Corporations are not
true moral agents, even if they are people within the fiction of the law. 201
They do not have free will. 202 So how could corporations suffer a defect of
will?
These intuitions are powerful but misleading. The volitional test is not
about will, free or otherwise. 203 Rather, it is about the important role of
control as a precondition of criminal liability—a defendant who cannot
control his actions is beyond blame. 204 However odd it may be to speak of
corporate will, corporate control is much more natural. Indeed, corporate
control over employee action goes to the very heart of the agency principles
that motivate respondeat superior liability. 205 The corporation—by virtue of
201F

202F

203F

204F

205F

201

This claim is common sense but deeply controversial. Compare Peter A. French, The
Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 207 (1979) (“I hope to provide the
foundation of a theory that allows treatment of corporations as members of the moral
community, of equal standing with the traditionally acknowledged residents: biological
human beings . . . .”), with Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (1982) (“Since it is a legal fiction, a corporation is
incapable of having social or moral obligations . . . .”). If I am wrong and corporations truly
are moral agents, my argument that they should be able to benefit from the insanity defense
only becomes easier.
202
Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA.
L. REV. 443, 473 (2005) (“A free will test is particularly useless, and particularly ridiculous,
when the free will in question is that of an entity such as a corporation.”); Edwin M.
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1926) (“[I]t is
astonishing for how many centuries the theory of fault resting on an alleged free will served
to relieve corporations, public and private, of responsibility in tort.”).
203
This is despite some theorists’ claims to the contrary. See, e.g., LeBlanc, supra note
56, at 1316 (“The criminally insane offender is characterized by a complete absence of free
will over his actions.”).
204
See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006) (“The volitional incapacity or
irresistible-impulse test . . . asks whether a person was so lacking in volition due to a mental
defect or illness that he could not have controlled his actions.”); United States v. Lyons, 739
F.2d 994, 1000 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (“When a defendant is properly acquitted
by reason of insanity under the control test, the guilty does not go free . . . . [For] those few
unfortunate persons so afflicted by mental disease that they knew what the law forbade but
couldn’t control their actions sufficiently to avoid violating it[,] [t]he nature of their illness
makes punishment useless . . . .”).
205
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1958) (“The
assumption of control is a usual basis for imposing tort liability when the thing controlled
causes harm.”).
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its theoretical control over employee conduct—is held vicariously liable for
conduct taken within the scope of employment. 206
The volitional test defines the relevant notion of control in terms of
“capacities” (which corporations have) rather than “wills” (which
corporations lack). 207 Any defendant that “lacks substantial capacity . . . to
conform [its] conduct to the requirements of [the] law” is legally insane. 208
Since, according to respondeat superior, corporate conduct is just employee
conduct, any corporation that lacks the substantial capacity to get its
employees to obey the law should qualify. The question of whether
corporations can ever satisfy the volitional test becomes: Can it ever be that
a corporation lacked the substantial capacity to control an employee who
commits the crime on the job?
Having now translated the volitional test to the corporate context, it is
much easier to see how a corporation might satisfy it. Suppose, for example,
that a corporation has in place a stellar compliance program that trains
employees about the law’s requirements and monitors their adherence to
legal and ethical norms. Suppose further that the program significantly
exceeds industry standards and has all the features that any informed
prosecutor would think to recommend. The DOJ’s “Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations” offer some insight into what some of
those features would be: “comprehensiveness,” “disciplinary action [against
past violators],” “revisions to [the] corporate compliance program,”
“promptness of any disclosure of wrongdoing to the government,” “internal
audit functions,” and “information and reporting system[s].” 209 This
hypothetical corporation has all of those features.
Now suppose that one of the compliant corporation’s employees
subverts its robust compliance program and commits a crime. The
206F

207F

208F

209F

206

Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1645 (1990); see
also Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism
and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 868–69 n.23 (2003) (“There is
also an emerging notion that artificial persons, like natural persons, must control themselves
in a manner that comports with civilized society and the behavioral rules by which it is
governed.”).
207
I set aside the older “irresistible impulse” formulation of the volitional test because it
is not clear that corporations have impulses in any interesting sense. Under respondeat
superior, corporate impulses are the impulses of its employees. A corporation with an
employee who, because of an irresistible impulse, commits a crime might derivatively claim
the same insanity defense that would protect the employee.
208
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
209
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Just.,
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter
Thompson Memo].
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compliance literature refers to such employees as “rogues.” 210 As even the
DOJ recognizes, every corporation faces a risk of rogue employees: “[N]o
compliance program can ever prevent all criminal activity by a corporation’s
employees.” 211 Corporations cannot monitor their employees perfectly, 212 so
there is always a chance that some misconduct will go undetected, especially by
motivated rogues. 213 This is the economic reality of agency costs—the
inevitable divergence of employee and corporate interests (discussed in Part
IV.B.1). Agency costs can be mitigated by efforts to align incentives, to monitor
more heavily, or to sanction employee misconduct, but they can never be
eliminated. 214
One company that serves as a real-world example of this dilemma is
Siemens AG. 215 After an extensive international investigation into alleged
foreign bribery, 216 Siemens pled guilty in 2008 to one of the largest-ever
public corruption scandals. 217 As part of its plea agreement, Siemens agreed
210F

211F

212F

213F

214F

215F

216F

217F

210

George R. Skupski, The Senior Management Mens Rea: Another Stab at a Workable
Integration of Organizational Culpability into Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 263, 277 (2011) (“[R]espondeat-superior-based liability likely creates contrary control
incentives due to its creation of constructive strict liability. This effect is best exemplified in
cases where a rogue agent acts contrary to corporate policies and well-intentioned efforts to
control the subordinate’s conduct.”).
211
Thompson Memo, supra note 209, at 9; see also Hasnas, supra note 85, at 1343–44
(“But all managers know that no matter how good their organization’s internal controls may
be, they cannot ensure that no rogue employee will intentionally violate the law . . . .”).
212
See Henry L. Tosi, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia & Debra L. Moody, The Separation of
Ownership and Control: Increasing the Responsiveness of Boards of Directors to
Shareholders’ Interests?, 4 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 46 (1991) (“[E]ven if the principle
[sic] is willing to incur agency costs of monitoring, it may still be difficult to effectively
control agents.”); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 780–81 (1972); Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 n.10 (1976).
213
See Irwin Schwartz, Toward Improving the Law and Policy of Corporate Criminal
Liability and Sanctions, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 112 (2014) (“No organization—private or
government—can prevent all misconduct by all employees, all of the time.”).
214
See infra notes 392–99 and accompanying text.
215
SIEMENS, https://new.siemens.com/global/en.html [https://perma.cc/A2EE-S7BY]
(last visitedFeb. 15, 2021).
216
See Information, United States v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina), No. 1:08-cr-367-RJL
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/20
13/05/02/12-12-08siemensargen-info.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM3U-ZQE6].
217
Department’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2013/05/02/12-12-08siemensvenez-sent.pdf
[hereinafter Siemens Sentencing Memo].] [https://perma.cc/QG4T-XZYL]. Brandon Garrett
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to work closely with government monitors to implement new and
dramatically expanded compliance protocols. 218 Siemens became a
governmental partner and catalyst for change by requiring all of its business
partners to have similar anti-corruption standards. 219 The efforts were a great
success. After its reforms, Siemens was hailed by the DOJ as having “set a
high standard for multi-national companies to follow.” 220 Despite Siemens’
600-person compliance department, industry leading Anti-Corruption Toolkit,
and additional compliance controls in high-risk jurisdictions, reports of rogue
activity soon resurfaced. 221 In its 2013 SEC filings, Siemens reported internal
and public investigations into public corruption connected to its activities in
Kuwait, the Caribbean, Central Asia, Turkey, Iraq, Brazil, Argentina, Greece,
Switzerland, Austria, Venezuela, South Africa, Thailand, and Bangladesh. 222
As a matter of black-letter law, compliance programs presently have no
impact on a corporation’s criminal liability. The DOJ’s official position is that
“[a] corporate compliance program, even one specifically prohibiting the
very conduct in question, does not absolve the corporation from criminal
liability.” 223 Federal courts have reinforced this stance: “[A] compliance
program, however extensive, does not immunize the corporation from
liability when its employees . . . fail to comply with the law.” 224 Thus, despite
world-class compliance investments, Siemens remains chargeable for bribery by
a rogue employee wherever and whenever it occurs.
A corporation plagued by a rogue employee despite having a robust
compliance program “lack[s] [the] substantial capacity to . . . conform [its]
conduct to the requirements of [the] law.” 225 For individuals, efforts to
conform to the law take the form of psychological resolve. A person who,
218F

219F

220F

221F

2 22F

223F

224F

225F

offers an effective treatment of the Siemens case throughout his book Too Big to Jail. See
generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS (2014) (discussing Siemens extensively).
218
Siemens Sentencing Memo, supra note 217, at 11.
219
Id. at 22–24.
220
Id. at 24.
221
Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 609, 614–15 (2012).
222
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Form 20-F Annual Report at 40–42 (Nov. 27, 2013),
https://www.siemens.com/investor/pool/en/investor_relations/financial_publications/sec_fili
ngs/2013/20_f.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2ZN-2KV7].
223
Thompson Memo, supra note 209, at 9.
224
United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989);
see also United States v. Ionia Mgmt., 555 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e refuse to adopt
the suggestion that the prosecution, in order to establish vicarious liability, should have to
prove as a separate element in its case-in-chief that the corporation lacked effective policies
and procedures to deter and detect criminal actions by its employees.”).
225
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
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despite evincing substantial resolve not to take others’ property, ends up
stealing something, could suffer from kleptomania and be a candidate for an
insanity defense to theft. 226 Corporations show equivalent effort by
implementing well-meaning compliance programs designed to prevent
employee misconduct. 227 Greater expense and more extensive protocols
correlate to increased corporate effort. 228
When rogue employees subvert extensive compliance efforts, their
employers lack the substantial capacity to control them. Though, in
hindsight, it may appear that some additional compliance protocol could have
prevented the misconduct, 229 that fact shows only that the corporation had
some capacity for control, not that it had substantial capacity. The presence
of a robust compliance program is important. A corporation with a limited
program would have a difficult time proving that it lacked the substantial
capacity to control a rogue because it did not expend much effort. 230
Not only does our hypothetical corporation satisfy the language of the
volitional test for insanity, giving it a defense for rogue conduct also
promotes criminal law’s fundamental goals. It is “inherently inequitable” 231
as a retributive matter to sanction a corporation—and by extension all its
stakeholders—when it acts “with the best of motives, with the best of efforts,
226F

227F

228F

229F

230F

231F

226
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 461 (5th ed. 2013) (noting that kleptomaniacs suffer from “problems in both
emotional and behavioral regulation”).
227
Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault,
and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1160 (1983) (“[O]rganizational offenders cannot exert
self-control merely by individual self-denial. Self-denial on these offenders’ parts must be
embodied in corporate policy and backed by appropriate disciplinary measures and
organizational procedures.”).
228
Mihailis Diamantis, Functional Corporate Knowledge, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319,
374–75 (2019) (defining corporate effort).
229
See Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281, 1316 (2011) (“[T]he fact that fraud occurred will be used as
evidence that internal compliance failed and that the failure was avoidable.”).
230
See Richard S. Gruner & Louis M. Brown, Organizational Justice: Recognizing and
Rewarding the Good Citizen Corporation, 21 J. CORP. L. 731, 763–64 (1996) (discussing how
to weigh the sufficiency of a compliance program by balancing policies that encourage
misconduct against good faith efforts to prevent misconduct).
231
Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 206, at 1653 (“For the government to recommend—
or require—compliance programs and then dismiss them as irrelevant has an inherently
inequitable ring.”); see also Lucian E. Dervan, Re-Evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability:
The DOJ’s Internal Moral Culpability Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON
L. REV. 7, 17–18 (2011) (noting that in such cases, corporations lack the “moral culpability
element”).
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and with the utmost in ‘due diligence’” 232 Cognitive scientists know that
people ordinarily think about corporate blameworthiness in the same way
they think about human blameworthiness. 233 When individuals take
extensive precautions and nonetheless find themselves on the wrong side of
the law, we generally recognize their blamelessness. 234 Similarly,
corporations that do the same are not “worthy of criminal sanction.” 235
Criminal law also has no deterrent interest in punishing such
corporations. As former Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson has
remarked, “[I]f you really want to have a deterrence of corporate criminal
liability, the best weapon against corporate misconduct is establishing an
effective compliance program.” 236 The sort of corporation presently under
consideration already has an effective compliance program. So, the criminal
law already deters the corporation as much as it could hope. Punishing such
corporations risks undermining deterrence by discouraging corporations
from undergoing the expense of implementing robust compliance in the first
place. 237 For the same reason, the criminal law has no interest in
232F

233F

234F

235F

236F

237F

Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative
Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1537 (2007).
233
See Bertram F. Malle, The Social and Moral Cognition of Group Agents, 19 J.L. &
POL’Y 95, 132 (2010) (“[G]roup agents can be blamed through the operation of the same
cognitive apparatus through which individuals are blamed.”).
234
See ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 61
(“[R]ecklessness is generally accepted as the norm for minimum culpability, and reliance
upon negligence to establish liability is viewed as appropriate only in the exceptional case.”);
Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3 THEORETICAL
INQ. L. 283, 286–88 (2002) (“[T]he primary fault underlying a negligence [tort] claim is the
actor’s failure to take a reasonable precaution against the risk of harm.”); Kenneth W.
Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1078
(1997) (“refer[ring] throughout to ‘negligence’ as a minimally acceptable form of fault”).
235
Cheryl L. Evans, The Case for More Rational Corporate Criminal Liability: Where
Do We Go from Here?, 41 STETSON L. REV. 21, 28 (2011) (emphasis omitted); see Charles J.
Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs As a Defense to Criminal Liability:
Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 689 (1995) (arguing that a
corporation with robust compliance “lack[s] the culpable mental state necessary to hold it
responsible for a criminal action”); H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of
Corporations for the Acts of Their Employees and Agents, 41 LOY. L. REV. 279, 327–28 (1995)
(arguing that corporations with robust compliance programs lack “organizational
culpability”).
236
Thompson, supra note 5, at 1327.
237
See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 206, at 1653 (“On a cost/benefit basis, the
present state of the law does not provide the same incentive [to implement compliance].”). But
see Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 110–11 (2007)
(“[I]nstitution of a compliance program defense risks creating a system of under-deterrence.”).
232
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rehabilitating or incapacitating corporations that already have effective
compliance programs.
Several scholars have proposed a defense for corporate criminals—the
due diligence defense—that would often overlap with the insanity defense
proposed here. 238 The due diligence defense would allow a corporation’s
“compliance program [to] operate as a defense against corporate criminal
liability.” 239 Where a corporate criminal defendant could show that it had an
otherwise effective compliance program, the due diligence defense would
allow it to avoid conviction. The Model Penal Code includes a limited
version of this defense. 240
The volitional prong of the corporate insanity defense overlaps with, but
is ultimately more nuanced than, the due diligence defense. Every
corporation that would benefit from the due diligence defense would likely
also qualify for the insanity defense. The reverse is not true. A robust
compliance program targeted at preventing the sort of crime with which the
corporate defendant is charged is not an absolute requirement of the insanity
defense. Of course, having such a compliance program significantly
strengthens the corporation’s case that it lacked the substantial capacity to
control its rogue employee. It is to be expected that most corporations that
successfully mount an insanity defense would have effective compliance
programs in place. But the corporate insanity defense could also be available
in two circumstances to corporate defendants that lack a compliance
program. The first circumstance is where no reasonable program would have
prevented the misconduct anyway. For example, a technologicallysophisticated and motivated rogue may purposely compromise his
employers’ automated compliance protocols to effectuate his crime. The
second is where the sort of misconduct, while perhaps preventable with the
right program, was not foreseeable. For example, a compliance program
might address all manner of misconduct pertinent to ordinary business
operations, but a rogue employee may divert business resources to pursue
unrelated misconduct that his employer could neither reasonably predict nor
reasonably prevent. The due diligence defense would not kick in for either of
238F

239F

240F

238

See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 221, at 611; Podgor, supra note232, at 1538; Steven M.
Kowal, Vicarious Corporate Liability: Judges Should Credit Diligent Compliance When
Evaluating Criminal Intent, 24 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 1, 4 (2009) (“Companies should not be
held criminally responsible for conduct that their best compliance efforts were unable to
prevent.”); Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 235, at 676.
239
Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 206, at 1652.
240
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (AM. L. INST. 2019) (“[I]t shall be a defense if the
defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having
supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to
prevent its commission.”).
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these cases. 241 The insanity defense provides room for corporations in these
two circumstances to argue that they nonetheless lacked the substantial
capacity to control their employees. It thereby puts the criminal law in a
better position to refrain from asking corporations to do that which is not
reasonably possible.
The insanity defense has one other crucial advantage over the due
diligence defense: it requires no new law in jurisdictions that endorse the
volitional test for insanity. If, as argued here, corporations can satisfy the test,
judges could implement the corporate insanity defense without waiting for
legislative action. This is not so with the due diligence defense. Scholars have
touted the due diligence defense for more than forty years. 242 To this day,
“[i]n the American legal system, a due diligence defense is not common for
legal bodies.” 243 Quicker progress could be made with the corporate insanity
defense.
241F

242F

243F

B. SATISFYING THE COGNITIVE TEST

Can a corporation “lack[] substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the
criminality of [its] conduct?” 244 After translating the cognitive test to the
corporate context, it becomes easier to see how this capacity could be
compromised in a corporation. An individual who satisfies the cognitive test
for insanity may “understand the physical nature and consequences of his act,
but not its legal or moral character.” 245 According to respondeat superior,
corporations only understand or appreciate things when their employees do.
This means that a corporation whose employees fail to appreciate the
criminality of their collective conduct may be a candidate for an insanity
defense under the cognitive test.
Organizational scientists have long recognized that “[o]rganisations are
systems . . . not just aggregations of individuals.” 246 For example, corporate
244F

245F

246F

241

Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 235, at 685–86 (describing the elements of a due diligence
defense).
242
See Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1256 (1979).
243
Eli Lederman, Corporate Criminal Liability: The Second Generation, 46 STETSON L.
REV. 71, 73 (2016).
244
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
245
ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173; see also
State v. Singleton, 48 A.3d 285, 295 (N.J. 2012) (distinguishing the capacity to understand an
act from the capacity to understand its moral character).
246
Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime:
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 479 (1988); Joep P.
Cornelissen, S. Alexander Haslam & John M. T. Balmer, Social Identity, Organizational
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culture is a feature of the organization itself. 247 Though it is not a feature of
the individuals who compose the organization, it is a critical factor that
influences how employees behave and think. 248 Corporate culture relates to
shared understandings, practices, and histories that bring some features of the
environment to social salience. 249 Factors that influence a corporation’s
culture include its hierarchy, goals and policies, treatment of prior offenses,
efforts to educate employees on compliance with the law, and compensation
scheme. 250 Individual employees adapt to corporate culture, 251 which in turn
can influence whether they engage in criminal conduct. 252 For example, a
high-pressure environment oriented toward quotas and production goals with
little emphasis on legal or ethical limits can foster malfeasance, even among
individuals not otherwise disposed to misbehave. 253
Defective corporate culture can have a normalizing effect on individual
misconduct. 254 Morally extraordinary behavior can come to seem
commonplace, ordinary, and banal. 255 People look to the behavior of those
around them for cues about what behavior is acceptable and what behavior is
247F

248F

249F

250F

251F

252F

253F

254F

255F

Identity and Corporate Identity: Towards an Integrated Understanding of Processes,
Patternings and Products, 18 BRIT. J. MGMT. S1, S8 (2007) (“[C]ollective identities (whether
social, organizational or corporate) are . . . associated with behaviour that is qualitatively
different from that associated with lower-order identities . . . .”).
247
Bucy, supra note 44, at 1099–1101.
248
FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION: BEYOND ‘PUNISH OR PERSUADE’ 25 (Keith
Hawkins ed., 1997) (“[O]rganizational culture forms the ‘touchstone’ by which individuals
behave and act.”).
249
See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 257–69 (1949).
250
Bucy, supra note 44, at 1101.
251
JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 427 (1990).
252
See generally Martin L. Needleman & Carolyn Needleman, Organizational Crime:
Two Models of Criminogenesis, 20 SOC. Q. 517 (1979) (introducing and exploring the concept
of crime-facilitative corporate systems in which participants are not compelled to perform
illegal acts, but rather face extremely tempting structural conditions that encourage or facilitate
crime).
253
See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo’s Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes at a
Cost, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wellsfargo-sale-pressure-20131222-story.html (discussing how the high-pressure sales
environment of Wells Fargo led to large-scale moral and ethical breaches); see also Mihailis
E. Diamantis, The Law’s Missing Account of Corporate Character, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
865, 873–74 (2019) (discussing the effect corporate level systems can have on individual
employee behavior).
254
Christina Parajon Skinner, Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1584 (2016).
255
Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 997 (2005).
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not. 256 Once microcultural and situational conditions push employee
behavior in an unethical direction, the effects can snowball. 257 Employees in
such environments may find their moral senses dulled. This can impair their
capacity to appreciate the potential criminality of the conduct of those around
them, conduct in which they themselves also engage. “[R]egular
people . . . succumb to the pressure of situational coercion[,] . . . people who
had no prior intention to do anything wrong.” 258
For example, in 2016, news broke that Wells Fargo had, for several
years, opened a large number of false accounts without customers’
knowledge or permission. 259 This violated the Consumer Finance Protection
Act of 2010. 260 Internal investigations revealed the problem’s source: a highpressure sales culture that encouraged retail employees to open eight
accounts for every customer regardless of need. 261 By some reports, “[t]he
fraud seems to have stemmed from CEO John Stumpf’s mantra to
employees: ‘eight is great.’” 262 But the motto long preceded Stumpf.
256F

257F

258F

259F

260F

261F

262F

256
See Floyd H. Allport, Methods in the Study of Collective Action Phenomena, 15 J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 165, 179 (1942) (“[T]he behavior of an individual in a collectivity must be
understood through seeing what other individuals in the collectivity are doing.”); Brian T.
Gregory, Stanley G. Harris, Achilles A. Armenakis & Christopher L. Shook, Organizational
Culture and Effectiveness: A Study of Values, Attitudes, and Organizational Outcomes, 62 J.
BUS. RES. 673, 675 (2009) (“Individuals use the organization’s culture to create behavioral
expectancies and then use these behavioral expectancies to decide the type of behavior that is
appropriate for a particular situation.”) (citation omitted).
257
See Francesca Flood, Social Psychology of Organizations, in GLOBAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC POLICY, AND GOVERNANCE 5699, 5702 (Ali Farazmand
ed., 2018) (“Social contagion theory suggests that behaviors can spread like a contagious virus
affecting worth [sic] ethic, manners, approachability, and a host of other organizational
behaviors.”) (citation omitted); Dan Currell, Finding and Fixing Corporate Misconduct, RISK
MGMT. (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.rmmagazine.com/2010/04/01/finding-and-fixingcorporate-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/9Y3D-L5SJ].
258
Saira Mohamed, Deviance, Aspiration, and the Stories We Tell: Reconciling Mass
Atrocity and the Criminal Law, 124 YALE L.J. 1628, 1648 (2015).
259
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Northwest Corporation, a bank that merged with Wells Fargo in 1998, 263
originated the “Going for Gr-Eight” theme. 264 According to one former
Northwest executive, “It was a religion. It very much was the culture.” 265
The high-pressure quota culture perpetuated itself after the merger:
“The better [employees] did at sales, the more they advanced, so it got spread
across the company. An entire generation of managers thrived in the culture,
got rewarded for it, and [came to] positions of power.” 266 Individual bankers
who perceived the ethical problems with this “gaming” (manipulating sales
for compensation) would quit (or be fired for underperformance), and the
beat would go on. 267 The practice became fully normalized: “[N]obody
seemed to care.” 268
The toxic culture at Wells Fargo was bigger than any individual
employee. It was systemic. Indeed, it may even have been bigger than Wells
Fargo itself. Commenting when the scandal broke, Hillary Clinton saw it as
a symptom of the broader “‘culture of misconduct and recklessness’ in the
banking system.” 269 It is not hard to understand how ordinary, wellintentioned Wells Fargo recruits could eventually lose their way. 270
Corporate culture can compromise a corporation’s capacity to
appreciate the criminality of its conduct without necessitating that its
employees are also legally insane. Recall that legal insanity must arise from
a disease or defect. While a toxic corporate culture impacts how both
employees and corporations distinguish right from wrong, it is only a defect
of the corporation. Culture is a social phenomenon beyond the control of any
263F
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single individual. 271 People exist within culture, and their susceptibility to its
effects is a normal adaptive mechanism of human psychology. 272 While we
may commiserate with Wells Fargo’s employees for other reasons (perhaps
they were coerced to do wrong), they were not insane.
The cognitive test’s biggest challenge is not whether corporations can
satisfy it, but whether it makes sense to excuse corporations that do. Wells
Fargo is not sympathetic. As I have argued elsewhere, corporations with toxic
internal cultures often seem like they are paradigmatic examples of evil
deserving the harshest responses. 273 Overcoming our strong punitive
instincts is a broader challenge that the cognitive test for insanity must meet.
Even for individuals, the line between the inability to appreciate moral wrong
and actually being morally wrong—between insanity and evil—can seem too
fine. One skeptical judge opined: “[T]hat which is sometimes called ‘moral,’
or ‘emotional insanity,’ savors too much of a seared conscience, or atrocious
wickedness, to be entertained as a legal defense.” 274
The criminal justice case for permitting a cognitive test for corporate
insanity does not turn on fairness considerations toward the corporate
defendant because it cannot. As I argue extensively below, 275 applying the
cognitive test may sometimes be fairest to victims. The full argument draws
on what the corporate insanity defense would look like in practice—how
corporations assert it and what happens if they are successful—which I lay
out in Part V. For now, I can only note the conclusion: allowing the cognitive
test for corporate insanity could secure more trials of corporate wrongdoing
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Michael C. Knowles, Michael Kyrios, Lyn Littlefield, J. Bruce Overmier & José M. Prieto
eds., 1st ed. 2011). (“Organizational culture is a complex and multi-level concept . . . . [It is]
[t]he shared understandings, expectations, and interpretations includ[ing] values and
assumptions of members, norms that invoke sanctions when broken by members, standards of
behavior that members are expected to display, and goals that members pursue while at
work.”) (citation omitted).
272
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Culture, Part I: Theoretical Considerations, 10 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 29, 46 (1989)
(“The richest source of information about local adaptation is the behavior of other members
of one’s social group. Learning mechanisms have evolved allowing humans to make use of
this valuable source of information, creating the social and cross-generational interactions
anthropologists lump together as ‘culture.’ Although these numerous mechanisms are
responsible for the existence of culture, virtually every other psychological mechanism also
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and better protect future potential victims by ensuring meaningful corporate
reform.
One might worry that the cognitive test for corporate insanity would
open the path for corporate gamesmanship. For example, some corporations
might purposely induce cultural defects to immunize themselves from
liability. This worry is not unique to the corporate context. A similar concern
arises for individuals, who could also purposely induce cognitive defects
(say, by taking intoxicants) before committing crime. With respect to
individuals, the law has solved this problem by disqualifying voluntarilyinduced insanity. 276 The same rule would apply to corporations: no
corporation that purposely instigates its own cognitive failings by
consciously promoting a criminogenic culture would qualify for the insanity
defense. Other scholars have pointed to the important difference between
“accidental” or “planned” corporate dysfunction for purposes of assessing
corporate culpability. 277 A corporation whose managers purposely craft a
criminogenic corporate culture to free its employees from law-abiding
psychological inhibitions would have no defense. Only corporations whose
cognitive deficiencies arose organically, as it were, without a directing hand,
could benefit from an insanity defense.
Even with purposely-induced defects excluded, another concern is
whether too many corporations would qualify for the defense. This concern
will be especially salient to people who are skeptical of corporations’
willingness and ability to encourage ethical behavior from their employees.
There is good cause for skepticism. As argued in the next Part, destructive
and bizarre behavior is essentially unavoidable for organizations like
corporations. Corporate law is a significant source of the problem because of
the way it understands what counts as a legitimate corporate purpose and who
is authorized to pursue that purpose on behalf of the corporation. Fortunately,
as the next Part also discusses, there are several limitations internal to the
corporate insanity defense that constrain its application. The best way to
address significant swaths of corporate misconduct likely lies outside of the
criminal justice system, in corporate law and mental health treatment for
employees.
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IV. THE ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY OF CORPORATE PATHOLOGY
This Article is far from the first to view corporations through an
interpretive lens according to which they are intelligent organisms. For the
better part of a century, economists have used biological and psychological
models to diagnose corporations as healthy or pathological. The best-known
expositor of such theories, Edith Penrose, turned to biology in an effort to
abstract away from “human motives” and understand firm success and
failure. 278 She saw firm growth as “a process of development, akin to natural
biological processes in which an interacting series of internal changes leads
to increases in size accompanied by changes in the characteristics of the
growing object.” 279 Economist Kevin Boulding advanced two competing
biological models of firm health as a kind of equilibrium: the “life cycle”
theory, which sees firms as ecosystems, 280 and the “homeostasis theory,”
which sees firms as organisms. 281 Armen Alchain’s viability analysis sees
firms as products of evolution and natural selection; health is market
survivability. 282
Critics point out that pure biological models of firms fail to appreciate
that firms do not behave like animals, “unconscious . . . [and] without much
deliberation.” 283 Rather, corporations have the capacity to respond to their
environment in rational ways. This means that any complete model of the
firm must account for its motivating psychology. 284
Economists and psychologists have obliged. More than two decades
ago, the American Psychological Association recognized industrialorganizational psychology as one of seventeen specialties in professional
psychology. 285 Among other topics, organizational psychologists study how
group behavior arises from organizational culture and individual
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interactions. 286 Economists have also provided numerous psychologizing
models of collective rationality and irrationality. 287
Psychology and economics can be tools for understanding healthy
corporate function and diagnosing corporate deviance. Though the law
explicitly subscribes to the fiction that corporations have minds,
psychologists and economists do not usually claim that corporations actually
have subjective points of view or human-like psychology. 288 The
psychologizing perspective that psychologists and economists offer is an aid
to fleshing out what the law’s fictional stance entails. By modeling
businesses as collectives possessing mental attributes, psychology and
economics can help identify when and why corporations behave in ways they
should not.
What the models suggest is dispiriting. The law seems to predispose
corporations to behave in pathological ways. This Part considers two salient
examples: psychopathy and self-destructive behavior. Both can have
criminogenic effects. If the corporate insanity defense applied to these
prevalent corporate conditions, it would pose a serious threat to corporate
criminal law and the interests it protects. As discussed, though, the
prevalence of these conditions disqualifies them. The insanity defense only
applies to “diseases” or “defects,” terms that demand a certain level of
abnormality. If the law is to address these underlying sources of corporate
misbehavior, it must look outside of the criminal justice system.
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A. CORPORATE PSYCHOPATHY

During the 1980s, Ford Motor Company performed a simple economic
calculation that tipped the scale in favor of killing many customers. 289 The
company knew that minor traffic accidents could cause its new Pinto model’s
fuel tank to leak and explode. 290 Of forty rear-impact tests that Ford
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conducted, every one occurring at more than twenty-five miles per hour
resulted in a “ruptured fuel tank.” 291 Internal memoranda showed that an
inexpensive safety device (a $1 plastic “baffle”) would have prevented the
lethal gas leaks. 292 But economic forecasts uncovered an even cheaper
approach: paying civil damages for wrongful deaths. 293 Ford assigned a
dollar value for each human life: $200,000 (in 1970s dollars). 294 Between 27
and 180 people (estimates vary) burned to death in Pintos. 295
During the late 2000s, the Peanut Corporation of America (“PCA”)
killed nine people 296 and sickened many hundreds more, most of them
children. 297 PCA knew this would happen. 298 Its peanut butter was tainted
with salmonella, a potentially life-threatening intestinal infection. 299 “Most
people . . . [get] salmonella by eating foods . . . contaminated by feces,”
often because farmers hydrate their fields with dirty water. 300 The
contamination was no surprise to anyone who had seen PCA’s facility.
Federal investigators discovered roaches, mold, and a leaking roof. 301 PCA
itself detected salmonella at least twelve times during the months leading up
to the outbreak and did nothing. 302 Publicly announcing the contamination
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would have damaged PCA’s reputation and would have required a costly
product recall. Cleaning the production lines would have brought its own
costs and delays. Instead, PCA continued business as usual, sending its
peanut butter to customers while falsely assuring them that the shipments
were safe. 303 According to the U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case, the
explanation was simple: “corporate greed.” 304
Ford’s and PCA’s behavior, devoid of concern for the suffering of
others, bears more than a passing resemblance to psychopathic behavior. 305
Organizational psychologists have used personality disorder diagnostic
criteria in systems analysis for years. 306 Dr. Robert Hare’s Psychopathy
Checklist–Revised (“PCL-R”) is the gold standard for diagnosing
psychopathy. 307 PCL-R consists of eighteen traits and behaviors including:
pathological lying, shallow affect, criminal versatility, lack of empathy, and
irresponsibility. 308 The fourth and fifth editions of the Diagnostic and
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Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) provide diagnostic criteria
that largely overlap with Dr. Hare’s. 309 Although there are no accepted
clinical criteria for diagnosing organizations with psychopathy, 310 Dr. Hare
believes that psychopathy is a helpful lens through which one can understand
corporate misconduct and the psychological mechanisms that lead to it. 311
309F
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1. The Law’s Role in Fostering Corporate Psychopathy
In a sense, Ford and PCA were behaving as corporations should. Indeed,
some commentators emphasize just how typical Ford’s actions were. 312
According to corporate law’s doctrine of shareholder primacy, corporations
are supposed to maximize shareholder wealth without regard to humanistic
considerations. 313 Human lives have no intrinsic value in this calculus; they
are the equivalent of some number of plastic baffles. Although corporations
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must always obey the law, 314 reducing all other decisions to matters of profit
can blur legal and moral lines.
Coincidentally, the doctrine of shareholder primacy traces its legal roots
to another case involving Ford from sixty years before the first Pinto rolled
off the assembly line. 315 During the early 20th century, Ford accumulated
significant capital surpluses that it wanted to use for philanthropic purposes:
to employ more people and lower the cost of its cars even further. 316 Henry
Ford, the company’s president and majority stockholder, described the
objective: “My ambition . . . is to employ still more men; to spread the
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them
build up their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting the greatest
share of our profits back into the business.” 317 But putting profits back into
the business meant they were not paid as dividends to shareholders expecting
a cut. This, the Michigan Supreme Court told the company, it could not do:
“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders . . . . [I]t is not within the lawful powers of a board of
directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely
incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting
others.” 318 It may be little surprise, then, that Ford Motor Company would
put profit over all else decades later.
The shareholder primacy principle is not the only source of corporate
psychopathy. Since corporate law attributes the actions and thoughts of
employees to their corporate employers, it stands to reason that a corporation
with psychopathic employees will itself exhibit psychopathic behavior. As it
turns out, there are a lot of psychopathic employees, particularly in
management positions. One percent of the general population are
psychopaths, 319 which equates to roughly 3.3 million people in the United
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States. 320 The incidence of psychopathy among corporate managers is tenfold higher. 321 Psychologists and business scholars who study the
phenomenon call these managers “corporate psychopaths” 322 (which they
distinguish from managers who merely foster generalized workplace
toxicity). 323 Corporate psychopaths have been on psychologists’ radars for
decades. 324 According to one prominent theory, corporate psychopaths are
so prevalent because they exhibit external characteristics like “polish, charm,
and cool decisiveness” that lead “organizations . . . [to] single[] [them] out
for rapid promotion.” 325
Corporate psychopaths foster systemically destructive corporate
behavior. Top management is one of the primary factors that determines
whether corporations promote lawful or unlawful behavior. 326 The presence
of “[c]orporate [p]sychopath[s] correlate[s] significantly and negatively with
the construct of [corporate social responsibility].” 327 This means that
corporations with psychopathic managers are less likely to engage in
responsible business practices and philanthropic projects. Employees at
organizations led by corporate psychopaths feel underappreciated and are
less likely to agree that their employers operate in ways that are socially
desirable, environmentally friendly, or beneficial to local communities. 328
320F

321F

322F

323F

324F

325F

326F

327F

328F

320
See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/M8D5-SMZ2] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
321
Catalyst: Corporate Psychopaths (ABC television broadcast May 5, 2005),
https://www.abc.net.au/catalyst/corporate-psychopaths/11008598 [https://perma.cc/XR6AZ22W]; Jack McCullough, The Psychopathic CEO, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackmccullough/2019/12/09/the-psychopathicceo/#15e4bc59791e [https://perma.cc/T34K-B96A] (“[T]he extent of the presence of
psychopaths in corporate America with most other estimates landing between 8% and 12%.”).
322
Boddy, supra note 319, at 256 (“Some psychopaths are violent and end up in jail,
others forge careers in corporations. The latter group who forge successful corporate careers
is called Corporate Psychopaths.”).
323
See Goldman, supra note 306, at 393.
324
See generally MICHAEL MACCOBY, THE PRODUCTIVE NARCISSIST: THE PROMISE AND
PERIL OF VISIONARY LEADERSHIP (2003) (discussing prevalence of one important
psychopathic trait—narcissism—among corporate elites); BABIAK & HARE, supra note 310
(charting the history of the rise of corporate psychopaths).
325
Boddy, supra note 319, at 257; see also Alasdair Marshall, Denise Baden & Marco
Guidi, Can an Ethical Revival of Prudence Within Prudential Regulation Tackle Corporate
Psychopathy?, 117 J. BUS. ETHICS 559, 562 (2013) (discussing Pareto’s classical elite theory).
326
Bucy, supra note 44, at 1126 (providing overview of executive interviews about
environmental factors leading to white-collar crimes).
327
Clive R. Boddy, Richard K. Ladyshewsky & Peter Galvin, The Influence of Corporate
Psychopaths on Corporate Social Responsibility and Organizational Commitment to
Employees, 97 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 8 (2010).
328
Id. at 11–12.
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Perhaps more surprisingly, studies show that corporate psychopaths are bad
for business. 329 “[U]ndiagnosed or misdiagnosed pathologies in our leaders
are a precursor to ever escalating organizational dysfunction,” 330 which
“adversely affect[s] productivity and ha[s] a negative impact
on . . . organizational effectiveness.” 331 Some business scholars argue that
the negative effects of corporate psychopathy can reach beyond individual
firms to undermine entire industries (such as finance). 332
329F

330F

331F

332F

2. Corporate Psychopathy Not Eligible for the Defense
It would be a significant strike against the corporate insanity defense if
it seriously weakened the tools criminal law has to hold psychopathic
corporations like Ford or PCA accountable. 333 That result would seem
unavoidable if, as some scholars argue, psychopaths qualify for the insanity
defense. For a variety of reasons, though, psychopathic corporations would
be ineligible.
Advocates for extending the insanity defense to individual psychopaths
ground their arguments in science. Though psychopaths do not suffer from
delusions 334 and often appear rational, 335 psychologists now know that
psychopaths’ lack of emotional affect limits their normal reasoning. 336
Psychopaths often make inconsistent statements and engage in contradictory
thinking because their words are not “fused with the affective meaning” that
333F

334F

335F

336F

329

Boddy, supra note 319, at 255 (“[T]he study of dark, dysfunctional, or bad leadership
has emerged as a theme in management research.”).
330
Goldman, supra note 306, at 410.
331
Boddy, supra note 319, at 256; see also Clive Boddy, Corporate Psychopaths and
Productivity, MGMT. SERVS. 26, 26 (2010).
332
See Boddy, supra note 319, at 255 (arguing that corporate psychopaths are responsible
for the 2008 financial crisis).
333
See supra Section III.A.
334
Fishette, supra note 307, at 1424 (“Because their actions appear ‘rational,’ in the sense
that they are aware of what they are doing and harbor no illusions about the nature or
consequences of their conduct, such psychopaths are generally held to be criminally
responsible for their actions.”).
335
Scott A. Bonn, The Differences Between Psychopaths and Sociopaths, PSYCH. TODAY
(Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/wicked-deeds/201801/thedifferences-between-psychopaths-and-sociopaths
[https://perma.cc/8E2N-XHCA]
(describing psychopaths as more “cool, calm, and meticulous”).
336
Laura Reider, Comment, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating
the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289, 293
(1998) (“Proponents of treating psychopaths as moral agents, however, fail to recognize that
cognition alone does not fully constitute practical deliberation or rationality. Although some
of these theorists acknowledge a richer conception of rationality than pure instrumental
reasoning, including a limited role for emotions, they stop short of including all of the relevant
capacities.”).
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helps shape proper use. 337 Psychopaths’ rational deficiencies extend beyond
mere word use. Studies show that psychopaths are “not capable of rational
choice . . . [because] the emotional and biological cues that normally guide
individuals in the decision-making process are absent.” 338 Psychopaths are
particularly handicapped in ethical reasoning, 339 which requires an emotional
capacity to respond to moral 340 or social stimuli 341 that psychopaths lack.
Consequently, some scholars argue, psychopaths cannot be morally
responsible for their criminal behavior. 342
The argument for extending the insanity defense to psychopaths,
whatever its merits, has yet to persuade lawmakers. 343 The drafters of the
Model Penal Code purposely excluded psychopathy from their definition of
insanity 344 by making the defense unavailable for “an[y] abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.” 345
Some psychologists agree with this approach because they think psychopathy
337F

338F

339F

340F

341F

342F

343F

344F

345F

337

Fishette, supra note 307, at 1432–33 (“This difference may be explained by the fact
that, for normal people, words are fused with affective meaning. Research confirms the fact
that psychopaths seem to lack the connotative and emotional knowledge that goes along with
our normal use of words. . . . It may well be that this disordered and contradictory thinking is
the result of their emotional poverty.”).
338
Reider, supra note 336, at 331.
339
Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual
Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 393 (1998) (“[Psychopaths are] irrational concerning moral
conduct.”).
340
Adina Roskies, Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from
“Acquired Sociopathy”, 16 PHIL. PSYCH. 51, 55–58 (2003).
341
ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN xii (2005) (ebook) (“[T]he absence of emotion and feeling is no less damaging, no less
capable of compromising the rationality that makes us distinctively human and allows us to
decide in consonance with a sense of . . . social convention.”).
342
Anthony Duff, Psychopathy and Moral Understanding, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 189, 190–92
(1977); see also Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New
Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 701 (1988) (“Desert is based on
the principle that a specific blameworthy act can be imputed to the person . . . who is in court
if, but only if, he had the capacity and fair opportunity to function in a uniquely human way,
i.e., freely to choose whether to violate the moral/legal norms of society.”).
343
See ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE
PSYCHOPATHS AMONG US 4–5 (1993); Natalie Jacewicz, Does a Psychopath Who Kills Get To
Use the Insanity Defense?, NPR (Aug. 3, 2016, 11:58 AM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2016/08/03/486669552/does-a-psychopath-who-kills-get-to-use-theinsanity-defense [https://perma.cc/48EV-7TNN] (“Oklahoma is not the first to carve those
with antisocial personality disorder, also sometimes called psychopaths or sociopaths, out of
the legal protections of insanity.”).
344
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 160 (AM. L. INST. Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)
(“[T]he diagnosis of psychopathic personality does not carry with it any explanation of the
causes of the abnormality.”) (citation omitted).
345
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
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is “distinct from a psychosis that undermines . . . [the relevant] capacity to
act rationally.” 346 Perhaps equally salient for lawmakers is the pragmatic
concern that “[i]f antisocial behavior were to constitute insanity, a substantial
proportion of serious criminals would be able to assert . . . [the insanity]
defense.” 347 As the Supreme Court of California put it, “such an expansive
role for the insanity defense would work more harm than good.” 348
Above and beyond the psychological and pragmatic reasons against
allowing individual psychopaths to raise the insanity defense, there are
decisive legal reasons to exclude psychopathic corporations. Most for-profit
corporations purposely orient themselves toward profit. This seeming
tautology has important implications. As discussed above, the profit motive
seems to be one significant explanation for psychopathic corporate behavior.
However, mental diseases and defects that result from voluntary choices—
like taking intoxicants—usually do not qualify for the insanity defense. 349
“To hold otherwise would allow . . . [a person] to steel his nerves, blanket his
conscience, and fortify his resolve . . . in preparation for a criminal
enterprise.” 350 Analogously, corporations that organize themselves to
prioritize profit over humanistic considerations should not be shielded when
they succeed. The DSM takes a related position in defining psychopathy,
which “must be distinguished from criminal behavior undertaken for gain
that is not accompanied by . . . [other psychopathic] personality
features . . . .” 351
Furthermore, if the profit motive is a significant contributor to corporate
psychopathy, then all or most for-profit corporations will exhibit it. The
insanity defense is only supposed to apply to relative rare diseases or defects
346F

347F

348F

349F

350F

351F

346
FINBARR MCAULEY, INSANITY, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 32–33
(1993); see also Clarkson, supra note 78, at 566–67 (“[M]oral responsibility need not
necessarily involve ‘emotional capacity to be moved by moral concerns.’ This would surely
involve our holding the cold and callous person who is unmoved by any moral concerns and
simply operates for personal profit or gain to lack moral responsibility . . . . They certainly do
not lack responsibility to the degree necessary for a finding of lack of responsibility (ie [sic]
insanity).”).
347
41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D. 615, supra note 80, § 7.
348
People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 708 (Cal. 1983).
349
Hassman, supra note 276, § 2[a] ; Morse, supra note 27, at 787–88 (“In other words,
the actor should not be excused if the irrationality or compulsion was the result of the person’s
rational, voluntary act. If the irrationality is produced by the voluntary and knowing ingestion
of a hallucinogen, for example, the actor is entirely responsible for the subsequent irrationality
and will therefore not be excused.”).
350
State v. Bower, 440 P.2d 167, 175 (Wash. 1968).
351
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 226, at 663.
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that represent deviations from the norm. 352 Near-universal traits—like
corporate profiteering—cannot suffice. 353
Even though corporate psychopaths would not qualify for the corporate
insanity defense, we may still wonder whether criminally punishing them is
the best response. To be sure, psychopathic traits in criminal defendants seem
to amplify our punitive impulses, even in white collar cases. 354 Yet, for
individual psychopathic criminals, the data show that punishment and prison
are ineffective criminal justice tools: they bring little deterrence or
rehabilitation. 355 The same is true of psychopathic corporate criminals. Some
scholars believe that the corporate form’s economics effectively guarantees
that corporations will always put shareholders and profits first. 356 So,
corporate psychopathy may be hardwired, leaving criminal law no way to
352F

353F

354F

355F

356F

352
Morse, supra note 164, at 531–32 (“The special treatment authorized by mental health
laws is usually based on the premises that the mentally disordered person is abnormal.”); Dan
M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 269, 344 (1996) (emphasizing “the doctrinal requirement that the defendant’s
incapacity stem from a mental disease”); Sallet, supra note 178, at 1545 (“[A] contested
insanity defense almost invariably requires that a lay jury decide the degree to which a
defendant is mentally ill, and not merely whether a defendant is mentally ill.”).
353
See Natalie Abrams, Definition of Mental Illness and the Insanity Defense, 7 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 441, 448 (1979) (“[Deciding] what the criteria are or should be in
distinguishing behavior which is so-called not normal from that which is normal . . . [] is
basically the question of the identification of mental illness. “); ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY,
MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173(b)(1) (“[C]ommunity recognition of
the severity of the abnormality is essential if those who engage in prohibited conduct are to be
excused without endangering the effectiveness of the general prohibition against that
conduct.”); see also Slobogin, supra note 100, at 1222 (“Current insanity tests are overbroad
because, if taken literally, they move too far toward the deterministic reductio ad absurdum
that no one is responsible.”).
354
Jennifer Cox, John F. Edens, Allison Rulseh & John W. Clark, Juror Perceptions of
the Interpersonal-Affective Traits of Psychopathy Predict Sentence Severity in a White-Collar
Criminal Case, 22 PSYCH. CRIME & L. 721, 733 (2016) (“Linear regression analyses suggest
participant perceptions of defendant psychopathic traits significantly predicted sentencing
recommendations, with participants who perceived the defendant as more psychopathic
recommending longer prison terms.”).
355
Harris, Skilling & Rice, supra note 197, at 233 (“Psychopaths derive little benefit from
programs aimed at the development of empathy, conscience, or interpersonal skills. There is
evidence that such programs actually increase the risk of recidivism among psychopaths.”);
Hare & Neumann, supra note 307, at 798 (“[Psychopaths] appear to derive little benefit from
prison treatment programs that are emotion-based, involve talk therapy, are psychodynamic
or insight-oriented, or are aimed at the development of empathy, conscience, and interpersonal
skills.”).
356
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001) (“And as the goal of shareholder primacy becomes second nature
even to politicians, convergence in most aspects of the law and practice of corporate
governance is sure to follow.”).
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unwire it. Furthermore, some sociologists believe that psychopathic
individuals will always find their way into senior corporate management.
According to classical elite theory, human social structures guarantee that
cunning and manipulative people will prosper in upper echelons. 357
Though we should still punish criminal corporations, we should set
aside any illusions that the criminal law can improve corporations with
psychopathic tendencies. Criminal law can at least give us is the catharsis of
striking back and provide us with the sense of justice done. 358
If we hope for change, we may need to reach outside of criminal law to
mental health systems and corporate law. Since corporate psychopathy seems
to be a systemic problem, it demands a systemic solution. More social
attention to individual mental health problems among corporate managers
would benefit the entire corporate hierarchy, including the managers
themselves. Successful people are not immune to mental illness. The popular
belief that white-collar crimes “are almost always . . . well-motivated and
performed with an uncommonly clear head” is almost certainly wrong. 359
The high incidence of personality disorder among upper corporate ranks
belies perceptions that corporate managers are “largely ‘reasonable’ men and
women” who need mental health treatment least. 360 While white-collar
offenders may have “relatively easy access to psychiatric treatment,” 361
personality disorders can hide themselves from the people who suffer from
them, making self-initiated treatment less likely. 362 We must continue to
357F

358F

359F

360F

361F

362F

357
See generally VILFREDO PARETO, THE RISE AND FALL OF ELITES: AN APPLICATION OF
THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY (8th prtg. 2009) (introducing foundational views of classical elite
theory).
358
See generally Christina Mulligan, Revenge Against Robots, S.C. L. REV. 579 (2018)
(arguing for the cathartic value of punishing robots).
359
BLINDER, supra note 64, § 8.1 .
360
Id.
361
Id.
362
Arthur Freeman & Ray W. Christner, Personality Disorders, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR THERAPY 280, 280 (Arthur Freeman, Stephanie H. Felgoise, Arthur M.
Nezu, Christine M. Nezu & Mark A. Reinecke eds., 2005).

Patients with personality disorders usually do not present for treatment to address underlying personality
problems; rather, they desire relief of symptomatic complaints including depression [or] anxiety . . . . The
typical pattern for patients with personality disorders is that they generally see the problems they
encounter or experience as outside of them and independent of their behavior. Pressure from significant
others in their lives or from the judicial system is often the enforcing agent to these patients seeking or
pursuing therapy. They often hold little insight about how they became the way they are, how they
contribute to their life problems, or how to change their actions, what they experience, and how they think.

Id. at 280.
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criticize “dark leader attributes—lack of empathy, ruthless preoccupation
with self-promotion, treacherous disloyalty to persons, groups and collective
beliefs” 363—but we should not stop at criticism. Recognizing that these
attributes can be symptomatic of underlying psychological distress could be
a step in the right direction.
We should also resist the supposed legal and economic necessity of
shareholder primacy in corporate law. Scholars have long proposed
extending the law’s conception of corporate purpose to include more
stakeholders. 364 Corporations less fixated on profit and more attentive to
social, labor, and environmental concerns would likely behave like the betterrounded citizens we want them to be. 365 There is cause for optimism on this
front. The Corporate Business Roundtable, whose members include Jeff
Bezos, Tim Cook, 366 and many other CEOs from major U.S. corporations, 367
recently voted to redefine corporate purpose as promoting “an economy that
serves all Americans.” 368 Although it is unclear what tangible effect this
nonbinding vote will have, 369 signatories have personally committed to
valuing customer, employer, supplier, and community interests alongside
shareholder value. 370
363F

364F

365F

366F

367F

368F

369F

370F

B. CORPORATE IRRATIONALITY AND IDENTITY DISORDERS

The previous Section showed that the law’s understanding of corporate
purpose pressures corporations to act like psychopaths. Even though
psychopathic action ignores common-sense humanistic concerns, it is often
hyper-rational from a practical perspective. This Section shows how the
363
Alasdair Marshall, Denise Baden & Marco Guidi, Can an Ethical Revival of Prudence
Within Prudential Regulation Tackle Corporate Psychopathy?, 117 J. BUS. ETHICS 559, 562
(2013).
364
See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (offering an alternative account of corporate
purpose).
365
Diamantis, supra note 253, at 888–91.
366
Members, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us/members
[https://perma.cc/RBQ6-Q2HV] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
367
About Us, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/JZW2-5CBE] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
368
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy
That Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE [https://perma.cc/YZ53-N6EZ] (Aug. 19,
2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
369
See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False
Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 123 (1999) (discussing failed previous attempt to
encourage stakeholder corporate governance).
370
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 368.
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law’s doctrines for understanding corporate behavior can destine
corporations to behave in ways that lack even the pretense of rationality.
1. The Law’s Role in Fostering Corporate Irrationality
A simple noncorporate example will illustrate the basic problem.
Suppose you are sitting alone on a park bench. An apartment window across
the street slides open and catches your attention. The weather is crisp outside,
but the air is fresh and invigorating. “Maybe the apartment was getting
stuffy,” you think to yourself. A couple minutes later, you see the window
slide closed. “Perhaps the air was a little too chill for whoever lives inside?”
But no, some minutes later, the window opens again. Soon after, it closes.
And then opens. And then closes. And opens. And so forth. After a half hour
of this, you decide whoever lives there must be rather eccentric, and walk
away not wanting to risk eye contact.
While it may have been impossible to see from your vantage point, there
is a simple explanation for the behavior you observed at the window. No
“eccentric” lives in the apartment. If you looked through the window, you
would learn that a couple, Jack and Jane Sprat, live there. They have opposite
tastes in temperature. Jack prefers it cooler. Jane likes it warmer. He was
opening the window; she was closing it. Though Jack and Jane were, as
individuals, acting rationally in light of their preferences, “the couple,” as a
unit, was behaving bizarrely. It makes no sense for anyone to repeatedly open
and close a window. To diagnose and fix the problem, you would have to
look through the window to see the individuals, their preferences, and the
systems that connect (or divide) them. In healthy relationships, couples have
interpersonal tools for solving such simple problems: a conversation, a
compromise, and a half-open window.
The law of corporate liability looks at the corporate window but not
through it. Corporations are legal constructs, “existing only in contemplation
of law.” 371 The law gets to define what corporations are and what counts as
corporate behavior. 372 Federal law’s approach, and the approach adopted by
most states, 373 is set out in the doctrine of respondeat superior: “[A]
corporation acts through its employees.” 374 All employee acts are
simultaneously corporate acts so long as the employees take them “within the
371F

372F

373F

374F

371

Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
See Diamantis, supra note 253, at 877 (discussing the need for corporate law “to
distinguish between actions that proceed from [a corporation] and events that happen to [it]”).
373
Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“The
federal system and most states use respondeat superior theories for finding a corporation
liable.”).
374
Cedric Kushner Promotions Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 166 (2001).
372
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scope of [their] employment [and] with the intent to benefit the
corporation.” 375
Though the scope and intent requirements may seem like they could do
significant work sifting true corporate acts from private employee acts, courts
have weakened both limitations to near inconsequentiality. Respondeat
superior applies even when an employee acts contrary to her employer’s
orders 376 and with an intent to benefit her employer in only a subsidiary, 377
hypothetical, 378 or ineffective 379 way.
375F

376F

377F

378F

379F

[T]he employer may be entirely blameless, may have exercised the utmost human
foresight to safeguard the employee; yet, if the alter ego, while acting within the scope
of his duties, be negligent—in disobedience, it may be, of the employer’s positive and
specific command—the employer is answerable for the consequences. 380
380F

Courts have rebuffed nearly every request to peer through the corporate
window to look at individual employees, systems, and incentives before
deciding whether to hold corporations liable for employee misconduct.
Corporate behavior just is employee behavior—all of it. 381
Economists and psychologists who study groups know that rational
action from individuals can lead to patently irrational group behavior.
Collective action problems like the tragedy of the commons are one familiar
example. 382 Individuals using a common resource (e.g., a pasture) may each
make rational self-interested decisions about how to use the resource (e.g.,
each puts more of his own sheep in the pasture) but thereby soon “brings ruin
to all” (e.g., the pasture becomes overgrazed and unusable). 383 The rational
course for the group would have been to use the resource sustainably.
Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem is another example of
individual rationality leading to group irrationality. 384 Arrow proved that
381F

382F

383F

384F
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Developments in the Law, supra note 242, at 1247; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 2.04 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“An employer is subject to liability for torts committed by
employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”).
376
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972).
377
United States v. Automated Med. Lab’ys., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
378
See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir.
1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
379
Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1945).
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New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917).
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So long as the employee is actually on the job. Corporations generally are not liable
for criminal acts employees commit in their private lives.
382
See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
(discussing the tragedy of the commons).
383
Id. at 1244.
384
Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328,
330 (1950).
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collectives that use voting to aggregate individual preferences (say, by
majority vote) will end up setting bizarre courses of action, 385 even if
everyone’s individual preferences are sensible. 386 For example, suppose
there are three possible projects (A, B, and C) that the group could pursue
and each individual votes on which project to pursue before the other
projects. Even if everyone votes rationally in accordance with their
preference about project order, the results may dictate that B should start
before A, C should start before B, and (impossibly) A should start before
C. 387
The tragedy of the commons and the impossibility theorem are not
difficult to explain. They are also relatively easy to mitigate once understood.
Privatizing communal property helps each person internalize the full costs of
its use. 388 Different voting procedures can reduce the chance of reaching
paradoxical results. 389 To appreciate the source of the problem and the
solutions available, one must take advantage of two perspectives,
simultaneously seeing the collective and the individuals composing it—the
forest and the trees.
Better internal corporate procedures cannot fix all the self-undermining
irrationality that corporate law currently attributes to corporations.
According to respondeat superior, each and every corporate employee
simultaneously instantiates the entirety of their employer’s capacity to act.
Arrow’s collectives at least have mechanisms for aggregating individual
preferences into unified group preferences. Corporate law, however, refuses
to aggregate individual employee behavior into unified corporate behavior.
From the law’s perspective, a corporation always takes every action that any
of its employees takes. This makes for a very strange picture of the sort of
“people” corporations are. If two employees argue, the corporation adopts
both sides of the argument. If two employees fight, the corporation at once
throws and receives all the punches.
385F
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385
Id. at 343 (“[T]he doctrine of voters’ sovereignty is incompatible with that of collective
rationality.”).
386
Id. at 334 (“[I]t will be assumed that individuals are rational . . . .”).
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Id. at 329.
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Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348
(1967) (“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater
internalization of externalities.”).
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DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS
441–76 (1992); Nathan Collins, Arrow’s Theorem Proves No Voting System Is Perfect, TECH,
(Feb. 28, 2003), http://tech.mit.edu/V123/N8/8voting.8n.html [https://perma.cc/49JN-DABT]
(“The practical question for policy makers and voters is which system manages to run in to its
problems least often.”).
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Of more practical concern, where different employees have inconsistent
understandings of corporate objectives or have conflicting individual goals,
respondeat superior says the corporation simultaneously pursues them all.
For example, one employee in a hiring department might make hiring
decisions on purely objective criteria, another might give undue preference
to men, a third might give undue preference to women, and a fourth might be
running compliance to make sure all hiring practices are legal. According to
the way the law defines corporate behavior, this corporation, at one and the
same time, hires in a nondiscriminatory way, engages in gender
discrimination (both in favor of and against women), and tries to prevent
discrimination.
According to respondeat superior, corporations literally have multiple
identities and act on them all. In any natural person, such patterns of behavior
could be symptomatic of a disruptive psychological condition called
“dissociative identity disorder” (“DID,” formerly “multiple personality
disorder”). “[DID] is a rare condition in which two or more distinct identities,
or personality states, are present in—and alternately take control of—an
individual.” 390 The DSM-V diagnostic criteria for DID include
“discontinuity in . . . sense of agency, accompanied by related alterations
in . . . behavior . . . ” that “impair[] social, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning . . . .” 391 While DID may be rare among natural people,
respondeat superior effectively prescribes it for all corporate people.
Even focusing on single personalities, the law necessitates that
corporations will behave in irrational and self-destructive ways. The source
of the problem is an unavoidable feature of any agent–principal relationship:
agency costs. 392 Employees have a “natural incentive to advance their
personal interests even when those interests conflict with the goal of
maximizing firm value.” 393 Since employers can never perfectly monitor
their employees, employees can act opportunistically at their employers’
390F

391F

392F

393F

390
Dissociative
Identity
Disorder,
PSYCH. TODAY (Feb.
22,
2019),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/conditions/dissociative-identity-disorder-multiplepersonality-disorder [https://perma.cc/FBZ4-BVWU].
391
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 226, at 292.
392
Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder SelfHelp in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 188 (1997) (“[C]orporate
law’s most important and difficult challenge is to reduce agency cost. . . .
The inevitable conflict between the rational economic interests of the agent and those of the
principal produces an unavoidable loss of wealth, as compared to an unrealistic realm in which
agents actually ignored their own interests.”).
393
Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 775 (2017).
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expense. 394 This opportunism may manifest itself in relatively mundane
ways, like shirking on the job or using the office printer to make garage-sale
signs. It can also show itself in criminal conduct that is far from mundane,
like boosting sales numbers through fraudulent bookkeeping or trimming
costs by dumping pollutants illegally. Such activities secure private benefits
for the employees who carry them out (e.g., performance bonuses, bolstered
reputation, promotion, etc.), often with little real risk of getting caught. The
corporate form can obfuscate employees’ identity and shield them from
detection. 395
Since respondeat superior ignores these agency costs, it forces the law
to see corporations as behaving in irrational and self-destructive ways. The
consequences for corporations can be devastating. For one thing, the
expected costs of employee crime to the corporation usually outweighs any
benefit the corporation may incidentally derive. Studies show that corporate
crime generally decreases overall corporate value. 396 And decades of
experience show that corporations are much easier targets for prosecution
than employees. 397 Sometimes corporations do not even have to wait for a
criminal charge to experience the costs of employee crime. As in Sun
Diamond (discussed in the Introduction), the corporation itself may be the
victim. Employees can enrich themselves by illegally filching corporate
money or making illicit use of corporate information. Since the crimes of
corporate agents (i.e., employees) are the crimes of the corporate principal
394F

395F

396F

397F

394

See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 212, at 327–28.
See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bringing
Criminal
Charges
Against
Corporations
(June
16,
1999),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/chargingcorps.PDF [https://perma.cc/7GUW-V43K].
396
Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals?
Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 22 (1999).
397
James B. Stewart, In Corporate Crimes, Individual Accountability Is Elusive, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/business/in-corporate-crimesindividual-accountability-is-elusive.html
[https://perma.cc/5SLP-2F5K]
(“Professor
[Brandon L.] Garrett analyzed 303 nonprosecution and deferred prosecution agreements with
corporations from 2001 to 2014 in which companies avoided guilty pleas by paying fines and
agreeing to other measures . . . . [and] found that individuals were charged in only 34 percent
of the cases.” After Professor Garrett asked prosecutors why this is the case, he reported that
“[s]ome say they don’t have the resources. It’s one thing to settle with a big company and
another thing to do serious investigations of dozens of people. Others say these aren’t really
intentional crimes, or it’s difficult to establish intent in individual cases. Others just repeat the
party line, which is, ‘We target individuals whenever we have the evidence.’ All of those are
probably true to some extent.”).
395
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(i.e., the employer), 398 the law sees corporations as committing crimes that,
contrary to all reason, only hurt themselves. 399
398F

399F

2. Mere Corporate Identity Disorders Not Eligible
Mere corporate irrationality of the sort just described, even when
analogizable to real psychological conditions like dissociative identity
disorder, would not qualify for the insanity defense. This may sound
surprising, given that courts often recognize that people who suffer from DID
can be candidates for the insanity defense. 400
Where multiple personalities are concerned, an interesting question
arises as to which personality is tried. Assume, for example, that an accused
has a dual personality. His usual personality is conforming and conventional.
During a dissociative episode, the accused switches to his alter personality
and commits a murder. At the time of trial, the accused is in his conventional
personality. Is it fair to try the conventional personality? Is it even
constitutional? 401 If a defendant suffering from DID engaged in criminal
conduct during a dissociative episode, the conventional personality
necessarily lacked control over the crime. 402 This would seem to be a
straightforward argument for the insanity defense under the volitional test.
There are two reasons why the corporate insanity defense would not
extend to corporate identity disorders. Though DID only affects 1.5% of the
400F

401F

402F

398
See Benjamin Thompson & Andrew Yong, Corporate Criminal Liability, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 489, 491–92 (2012) (“A corporation has no physical existence and can be held
vicariously criminally liable for the acts, omissions, or failures of employees acting as
agents.”).
399
Economists have shown that, as a general rule, corporate crime has a negative longterm effect on firm value. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 67, at 22.
400
State v. Lockhart, 542 S.E.2d 443, 446 (W. Va. 2000) (“[E]xpert testimony regarding
Dissociative Identity Disorder may be admissible in connection with a defendant’s assertion
of an insanity defense.”); United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1013–14 (10th Cir.
1993); Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness,
1 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 534, 596–97 (1995) (“[D]issociative identity disorder
. . . in appropriate cases ha[s] been accepted as [a] predicate[] for an insanity defense.”). But
see State v. Greene, 984 P.2d 1024, 1032 (Wash. 1999) (“[I]t was not possible to reliably
connect the symptoms of DID to the sanity or mental capacity of the defendant.”). Indeed,
fifty-five percent of criminal defendants with DID enter an insanity plea. See Sabra M. Owens,
Criminal Responsibility and Multiple Personality Defendants, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 133, 140–43 (1997).
401
41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615, supra note 80, § 14.
402
Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d at 1014 (“We are convinced that the trial court’s interpretation
of [the insanity defense statute and its application to a person suffering from multiple
personality disorder] is unreasonable in restricting the focus of the court and jury narrowly to
the alter or alters cognizant of the offense, and ignoring proof that the dominant or host
personality was not aware of the wrongful conduct.”).
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general population, 403 among corporations it is a near universal phenomenon.
Recall, these disorders for corporations arise because respondeat superior
treats corporations as though they act through all of their employees all of
the time. If two employees pursue conflicting conceptions of the corporate
good, the corporation simultaneously pursues them both. As a consequence,
most corporations necessarily have multiple personalities that are acting on
their behalf. The insanity defense, however, can only apply to relatively rare
conditions.
Additionally, the law has developed a way to use prosecutorial
discretion as a solution to corporate identity problems in criminal law. 404
When it comes time to charge a corporation, prosecutors can identify one
employee to stand in for the entire corporation. 405 Prosecutors then show that
that employee, while acting on behalf of the corporation, committed a crime.
As the courtroom narrative unfolds, the corporation effectively comes to
have just a single personality linking its past misconduct and its present
defense.
Allowing prosecutors to pick an employee to represent the entire
corporation has controversial criminal justice implications. It is not clear that
every employee is an equally plausible stand-in for the entire corporation.
Although many find it intuitive that upper-level management are good
proxies for corporations, those intuitions become strained as prosecutors
move down the corporate hierarchy. 406 Singling out just one representative
of the corporation also sidelines what other corporate employees were doing
at the time of the crime. That may be relevant if, for example, they were
403F

404F

405F

406F

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 226, at 294.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL §§ 9-28.210 (2018), 9-28.1300 (2015), 928.1400 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecutionbusiness-organizations [https://perma.cc/4VRW-VLN4]; Memorandum from Mark Filip,
Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2
008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf (“In making a decision to charge a corporation, the
prosecutor generally has substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even
whether to prosecute for violations of federal criminal law.”) [https://perma.cc/W7TF-ESDQ].
405
See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir.
1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (upholding conviction of corporation for bribes paid by
single employee).
406
See Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model
Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 40–41 (1957)
(“[High managerial agents] are the mens, the mind or brain, of the corporation.”); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 explanatory note (AM. L. INST. 2019).
403
404
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engaged in efforts to prevent the sort of misconduct at issue. 407 One might
have thought that the concerted action of many employees would be more
reflective of the corporation than the deviant action of just one. But the
prosecutor need not consider this. 408 Whatever the criminal justice
implications of letting prosecutors pick a corporate personality for trial, that
approach at least fixes the conceptual challenges posed by corporate DID—
the corporate identity at the time of the trial becomes the same as its identity
at the time of commission.
407F

408F

V. THE DEFENSE IN PRACTICE
Just as the test for the insanity defense varies by jurisdiction, 409 so does
its procedure. Long-settled Supreme Court precedent protects states’
decisions about how to implement the defense. 410 It is a doctrine that has
“historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the
tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing
religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This
process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the
States.” 411
Procedure determines not just how the defense operates in practice, but
what its criminal justice significance is. Shifting burdens of production and
proof shape who can assert the defense and how likely they are to succeed.
Any evaluation of the insanity defense would be incomplete without
considering the procedural consequences of successfully asserting it. In
contrast to most criminal law defenses, the insanity defense ordinarily does
not entail releasing acquittees to the general population. Routine release
would undermine many of the goals of the insanity defense, like protecting
409F

410F

411F

407

Bharara, supra note 237, at 65 (“[A] multinational corporation may theoretically be
indicted, convicted, and perhaps put out of business based on the alleged criminal activity of
a single, low-level, rogue employee who was acting without the knowledge of any executive
or director, in violation of well-publicized procedures, practices, and instructions of the
company.”).
408
See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972)
(upholding conviction of corporation for crime of single employee who acted against
corporate policies).
409
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 737 (2006) (“[T]he insanity rule . . . is substantially
open to state choice.”).
410
See generally Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897) (holding that the procedure by
which insanity is assessed is a matter of state legislation); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9
(1950) (upholding Georgia’s recognition of its governor’s competency to assess insanity);
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958) (upholding California procedure which denies
prisoners any right to initiate their own insanity determination).
411
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968).
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the public and the defendant from his condition. Most insanity acquittees
should be, and are, diverted to mental health facilities for a period of time. 412
This Part focuses on significant procedural decision points for
implementing the corporate insanity defense. Advocates of the individual
insanity defense often argue that modifying procedure can disarm critics’
concerns. 413 For corporate defendants too, sensible procedure can go a long
way toward addressing potential worries. Procedure can, as necessary,
ratchet down the defense’s availability and ratchet up its consequences.
An added nuance could be layered over the procedural
recommendations that follow. The discussion assumes that each jurisdiction
would apply its own, uniform procedure for all corporate defendants
claiming the insanity defense. Other models are available. The American Bar
Association, for example, recommends a two-tiered approach to the insanity
defense: one tier for defendants acquitted of violent felonies and another for
all other acquittees. 414 Federal law also partially uses a two-tiered system. 415
Some scholars propose a third tier specifically for homicide cases. 416 In that
third tier, the insanity defense could be prohibited or limited in various
ways. 417 Something similar may be appropriate for corporate defendants—
limiting the availability of the defense or amplifying the consequences of
asserting it for certain categories of corporate crime, e.g., those that cause
physical injury or significant market harms. Current corporate sentencing law
already singles out such crimes for distinctive treatment. 418 Corporations that
412F

413F

414F

415F

416F

417F

418F

412

LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1.
R. Michael Shoptaw, M’Naghten is a Fundamental Right: Why Abolishing the
Traditional Insanity Defense Violates Due Process, 84 MISS. L.J. 1101, 1130–32 (2015);
Morse, supra note 27, at 779 (“I believe that the insanity defense ought to be retained because
it is basically just, and that sensible and fair reforms can remedy most of the problems
associated with it.”).
414
CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS ON MENTAL HEALTH 7–7.2, 7.74 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/ment
al _health_standards_2016.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ARG-VE49].
415
18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (“[A] person found not guilty only by reason of insanity of an
offense involving bodily injury to, or serious damage to the property of, another person, or
involving a substantial risk of such injury or damage, has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that his release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another person or serious damage of property of another due to a present mental disease or
defect. With respect to any other offense, the person has the burden of such proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.”).
416
Wexler, supra note 55, at 555–57.
417
Id. at 550.
418
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C4.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (“If
the offense resulted in death or bodily injury, or involved a foreseeable risk of death or bodily
injury, an upward departure may be warranted.”); id. § 8C4.5 (“If the offense presented a risk
to the integrity or continued existence of a market, an upward departure may be warranted.”).
413
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conceal crime after it has occurred could also face more stringent standards
and consequences, perhaps even disqualification from the insanity
defense. 419
419F

A. TREATMENT AFTER ACQUITTAL

One obvious worry is that the insanity defense would let corporations
off the hook, freeing them to injure new victims with impunity and
emboldening future corporate criminals. That result would be a disqualifying
strike against the defense. However, the worry turns on a mistake about how
the insanity defense works. “An acquittal by reason of insanity is rarely a
ticket to freedom.” 420 For some scholars, this feature of the insanity defense
warrants its abolition. 421 As to the corporate insanity defense, mandatory
evaluation and treatment of acquittees is a critical safeguard.
Applying the insanity defense puts the criminal justice system in an
awkward position. By acquitting the defendant, the court necessarily finds
that he is not criminally or morally responsible for his misconduct. Yet the
court must also find that the defendant had a disorder that led to criminal
behavior. Releasing him could expose the public to a known source of
criminal harm and leave the acquittee without needed treatment.
The law adopts a sensible solution: committing the acquittee to a mental
health facility for a period of time. “Like defense of self, the defense of
insanity, if successfully pleaded, results in ‘acquittal.’ But unlike the
acquittal of self-defense which means liberty, the acquittal of the insanity
defense means deprivation of liberty for an indefinite term in a ‘mental
institution.’” 422 Often, defendants who successfully raise the insanity
defense spend more time under treatment, segregated from the general
420F

421F

422F

419
ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173(i)
(“Concealing one’s identity, fleeing a crime scene, hiding evidence, resisting arrest, and
showing awareness of consequences, can be reasonably interpreted to indicate knowledge of
a moral wrong, with regard to a mental-illness defense.”).
420
Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 605, 605 (1981); see
also AM. BAR ASS’N, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 404 (Samuel J. Brakel &
Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971); Henry Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 38 TEX. L. REV. 849, 849 (1960) (“A person acquitted of
crime by reason of insanity is of course not usually allowed simply to walk out of the
courthouse, a free man. In most states,' statutes provide that on such an acquittal, the judge
may (in some states must) order commitment.”).
421
Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the “Insanity Defense”—Why Not?, 72 YALE
L.J. 853, 864 (1963) (“Rather, its real function is to authorize the state to hold those who must
be found not to possess the guilty mind mens rea, even though the criminal law demands that
no person be held criminally responsible if doubt is cast on any material element of the offense
charged.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
422
Id. at 858.
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public, than they would have spent in prison if convicted. 423 As one Supreme
Court Justice has summarized the law, “[i]f a defendant establishes an
insanity defense, he is not criminally liable, though the government may
confine him civilly for as long as he continues to pose a danger to himself or
to others by reason of his mental illness.” 424
Treatment for corporations necessarily looks different than it does for
individuals, but it is nothing new. Organizational scientists and economists
have identified many potential causes of corporate insanity. 425 As above, I
continue to focus on the role of defective corporate culture and agency costs.
There are well-established strategies for addressing both. “Tone at the top”
seems to be one of the most crucial influence on corporate culture. 426 Upper
management sets the example and shapes the norms by which the rest of the
corporation operates. 427 It stands to reason that replacing managers whose
personalities and management style foster a criminogenic workplace
environment can help. That is why hiring new management is one of the first
responses many corporations take when they discover prevalent internal
misconduct. 428 However, sometimes internal dynamics can prevent a
423F

424F

425F

426F

427F

428F

423
Eric Silver, Punishment or Treatment?: Comparing the Lengths of Confinement of
Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Defendants, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 383–84 (1995).
While some jurisdictions time limit special commitment by the length of the sentence the
acquitted would have served if convicted, see, e.g., CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS ON MENTAL
HEALTH 7-7.7 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016); TEX. CODE 46C.269(a) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg.
Sess.), many important jurisdictions do not, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f).
424
Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038, 1038 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
425
I discuss them in much more detail in earlier work. See Diamantis, supra note 43, at
539–44.
426
See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 67, at 33–34.
427
MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME: THE ROLE OF MIDDLE
MANAGEMENT 54 (1983) (finding that more than fifty percent of Fortune 500 middle
management identify top management behavior as the most significant factor affecting culture
of ethical behavior in their corporation).
428
See Celia Moore, David M. Mayer, Flora F. T. Chiang, Craig Crossley, Matthew J.
Karlesky & Thomas A. Birtch, Leaders Matter Morally: The Role of Ethical Leadership in
Shaping Employee Moral Cognition and Misconduct, 104 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 123, 141
(2019) (“One of the most common responses to the discovery of corporate misconduct is to
replace the CEO . . . .”) (citing Marne L. Arthaud-Day, S. Trevis Certo, Catherine M. Dalton
& Dan R. Dalton, A Changing of the Guard: Executive and Director Turnover Following
Corporate Financial Restatements, 49 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1119 (2006)); Heather R. Huhman,
Leaders Everywhere Are Being Fired for Ethical Misconduct. Here’s How to Make Sure
You’re Not One of Them., INC. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.inc.com/heather-r-huh
man/leaders-everywhere-are-being-fired-for-ethical-misconduct-heres-how-to-make-sureyoure-not-one-of-them.html [https://perma.cc/U5X2-JNTS] (“[B]etween 2012 and 2016,
there was a 36 percent increase in the number of forced CEO turnovers due to ethical lapses.”).
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corporation from replacing management—the managers who need replacing
may be entrenched or may themselves be responsible for making personnel
decisions. 429 In such cases, compulsion by an external hand may be
necessary for meaningful change.
Implementing better compliance programs can be an effective course of
treatment for mitigating destructive agency costs. By definition, compliance
programs seek to prevent misconduct. 430 They involve “promulgation of
codes of behavior, the institution of training programs, the identification of
internal compliance personnel and the creation of procedures and controls to
insure company-wide compliance with legal mandates.” 431 Compliance
programs can keep employees in check with operating procedures designed
to prevent, detect, and sanction criminal conduct. 432 Once misconduct
occurs, an effective compliance program updates itself to reduce the chance
of it happening again. 433 As big data, automation, and artificial intelligence
come to play a larger role in compliance science, many agency costs will
become easier and cheaper to mitigate. 434
429F

430F

431F

432F

433F

434F

But see Anup Agrawal, Jeffrey F. Jaffe & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Management Turnover and
Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud, 42 J. L. ECON. 309, 339 (1999) (“In
univariate comparisons, there is some evidence that firms committing fraud have higher
managerial and inside director turnover. But in multivariate tests that control for other firm
attributes, the relations between turnover and fraud are either negative or statistically
insignificant.”).
429
See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through
Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 385 (2017) (“[Compliance reform] mandates should
be imposed only if the prosecutor has evidence to conclude that the inadequate policing was
due to substantial policing agency costs and that, absent intervention, such agency costs will
result in inadequate policing in the future.”).
430
See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C.L. REV. 949, 958
(2009) (“‘Compliance’ is a system of policies and controls that organizations adopt to deter
violations of law . . . .”); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the
Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1999) (“An elaborate cottage industry
of ethics compliance and preventive law experts lay claim to dramatically reducing the
likelihood of criminal liability by maintaining an organizational commitment to ethical
standards.”).
431
Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and
New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 466–67 (2008).
432
Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Body Corporate, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 155–57
(2021).
433
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.600, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-928000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.600 (“A corporation, like
a natural person, is expected to learn from its mistakes.”); id. § 9-28.800 (“Does the
corporation’s compliance program work? In answering these questions, the prosecutor should
consider . . . revisions to corporate compliance programs in light of lessons learned.”).
434
See William S. Laufer, The Missing Account of Progressive Corporate Criminal Law,
14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 71, 89–90 (2017).
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If corporate insanity can be treated along the lines just described, the
law must say who is to administer the treatment. Judges already occasionally
mandate some kinds of corporate treatment after conviction. 435 The
Sentencing Guidelines give judges broad discretion to design terms of
probation that can include implementing new compliance programs and
replacing personnel. 436 Prosecutors also frequently do something similar
before, and in lieu of, trial. Many DOJ investigations into corporate
misconduct end with deferred or nonprosecution agreements (“DPA” and
“NPA”), which avert trial in exchange for the corporations’ agreements to
pay fines and improve compliance. 437
Unfortunately, neither judges nor prosecutors are well-suited to the task
of treating defective corporations. Both lack the necessary expertise. 438
Compliance, corporate governance, and management are sophisticated
sciences. 439 They are not a part of the training regimen for judges and
prosecutors. Federal prosecutors are perhaps the biggest offenders, both in
terms of the significance of the cases they try to resolve through pretrial
diversion and the hubris they display. 440 Of prosecutorial compliance efforts,
the Government Accountability Office tells us that the “DOJ cannot evaluate
435F

436F

437F

438F

439F

440F

435

See, e.g., United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 59–61 (7th Cir. 1972)
(imposing probation on corporate convict and requiring compliance reform); see also
Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate
Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 12–26 (1988) (discussing the
emergence of corporate probation in federal law).
436
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
437
See Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 67, at 93 (“Criminal [deferred prosecution
agreements] now routinely require firms to reorganize business operations, adopt compliance
measures, submit to enhanced monitoring for legal violations, and create systems to encourage
and protect whistle-blowers.”).
438
See Baer, supra note 430, at 953 (“Despite the fact that the DOJ has intoned an interest
in generating a more ethical ‘corporate culture,’ its prosecutors have little expertise in bringing
about this development . . . .”); Diamantis, supra note 43, at 563–65.
439
See generally Shann Turnbull, The Science of Corporate Governance, 10 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 261 (2002) (discussing technologically sophisticated analysis of some
approaches to corporate governance). Many graduate schools offer advanced degrees in fields
such as corporate compliance and management. Launching a Career in Compliance
Consulting: 3 Frequently Asked Questions, ROBERT HALF (June 10, 2015, 6:00 PM)
https://www.roberthalf.com/blog/job-market/launching-a-career-in-compliance-consulting3-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/CA7X-PTYK]; MBA Programs and
Specialties, U.S. NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-business-schools
[https://perma.cc/DC59-3TQL] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020).
440
I have previously argued that judges are institutionally better situated to make
decisions about compliance reforms for corporate criminals. See Diamantis, supra note 43, at
559–62.
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and demonstrate the extent to which DPAs and NPAs . . . contribute to the
department’s efforts to combat corporate crime because it has no measures
to assess their effectiveness.” 441
The thought of turning treatment decisions over to judges or prosecutors
would strike us as absurd where individual mental health is concerned. It is
no less absurd here. As for individuals, corporate insanity acquittees should
receive expert treatment. There is no shortage of experts, including state of
the art compliance consulting firms. 442 Private, for-profit services to treat
corporate criminals may raise concerns about objectivity. Many states have
government-run facilities for housing and treating criminally insane
individuals. 443 One commentator has suggested that states should go further
and create mental-health sentencing boards to “determine both the
appropriate sentencing scheme and treatment of each offender that is found
[not guilty by reason of insanity], as well as monitor the offender’s
treatment.” 444 Both government-run treatment options and expert sentencing
boards would be suitable for implementing the corporate insanity defense.
These would necessarily entail expenses for an already resource-stretched
criminal justice system. Though individual insanity acquittees at state
441F

442F

443F

444F

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 10-110, DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER
TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE
EFFECTIVENESS
20–24
(2009),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10110.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CP8F-J496].
442
Such consulting firms include: ACCENTURE, https://www.accenture.com/usen/services/business-process-services/compliance-as-a-service
[https://perma.cc/U5LRMLQ2] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en.html
[https://perma.cc/ZP34-MC7P] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); DUFF & PHELPS,
https://www.duffandphelps.com/services/compliance-and-regulatory-consulting
[https://perma.cc/7JFX-4L7L] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); FTI CONSULTING,
https://www.fticonsulting.com/industries/public-sector/government-contracts/complianceand-regulatory-solutions (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); POLARIS GROUP, https://www.polarisgroup.com/services_compliance1.asp?page=compliance1 [https://perma.cc/Q5QZ-D3VK]
(last visited Oct. 18, 2020); SPARK COMPLIANCE CONSULTING, http://www.sparkcomplian
ce.com/ [https://perma.cc/NAE2-T5AD] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
443
See AMANDA WIK, VERA HOLLEN & WILLIAM H. FISHER, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE
MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., FORENSIC PATIENTS IN STATE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS:
1999-2016 103 (2017), https://www.nasmhpd.org/sites/default/files/TACPaper.10.ForensicPatients-in-State-Hospitals_508C_v2.pdf (providing data regarding census of “not guilty by
reason of insanity” patients per state) [https://perma.cc/E2CZ-2YMC]; New York State Office
of Mental Health Division of Forensic Services, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/forensic/bfs.htm; Oregon State Hospital, OR. HEALTH
AUTH., https://www.oregon.gov/oha/OSH/Pages/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/BX88-3ZFA].
444
Julie E. Grachek, Comment, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How
Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479,
1497 (2006).
441
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hospitals sometimes receive free treatment, 445 the present trend in corporate
criminal justice is to have corporations foot the bill for their own compliance
reforms. 446
Just as the law needs a different sort of expert to treat corporations, it
needs a different method for delivering treatment. For individuals, the
process is relatively straightforward. The state commits individuals to mental
health facilities, which serve a double purpose: They isolate potentially
dangerous acquittees from the general public and also provide a forum where
doctors can directly deliver treatment. The State cannot commit corporations
to a place of treatment. They have no bodies to lock away. 447 Even if it were
possible, segregating corporations from the public—their customers,
investors, creditors, etc.—would inevitably kill them, a self-defeating result
from a treatment perspective. 448
There are methods short of confinement to incapacitate criminal
corporations in ways that protect the public and make treatment possible.
They vary in the extent of the limitations they impose. On the more
permissive end, I have extensively discussed one approach which prosecutors
and judges currently use in their efforts to rehabilitate: hiring corporate
monitors who are experts in corporate reform. 449 A monitor would oversee
internal compliance improvements while allowing the corporation to
continue operating as a business. The powers granted to corporate monitors
445F

446F

447F

448F

449F

445
C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Constitutionality of Statute Imposing Liability upon Estate
or Relatives of Insane Person for His Support in Asylum, 20 A.L.R. 3d 363 § 2 (1968) (“It is
generally settled that the care and custody of insane . . . persons is vested in the state; the state,
under the traditional doctrine of parens patriae, controls, treats, and maintains the insane, both
for their protection and the protection of others . . . . [However,] [i]n a number of jurisdictions,
statutes have been enacted making the property of a[n] [inmate], or his relatives, liable for the
inmate’s maintenance and support while confined in a state asylum.”).
446
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4(b)(5) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018) (“Compensation to and costs of any experts engaged by the court shall be paid by the
organization.”).
447
See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981); JEREMY
BENTHAM, PANOPTICON VERSUS NEW SOUTH WALES; OR THE PANOPTICON PENITENTIARY
SYSTEM, AND THE PENAL COLONIZATION SYSTEM, COMPARED 27 (1812) (describing
incapacitation as a “body operating upon a body”).
448
See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 271, 277–79 (2008); Thomas, supra note 196, at 955 (“To reiterate, de jure suspension
means de facto death. No business can wait around for five years without operating; employees
will leave and third parties and customers will take their business elsewhere.”).
449
See generally Mihailis E. Diamantis, Monitorships: An Academic Perspective, in
GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW: THE GUIDE TO MONITORSHIPS (Anthony S. Barkow, Neil
M. Barofsky & Thomas J. Perrelli eds., 2019) (discussing the use of monitors to reform
corporate criminals).
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can be tailored to specific cases but typically include at least access to
necessary information, the authority to design compliance protocols, and the
means to ensure their implementation. 450
An intermediate to incapacitating corporations is also available:
suspending their privilege to conduct certain forms of business. 451 Many
industries require special licenses (e.g., to provide accounting services for
publicly traded companies) 452 or authorization (e.g., to file for Medicare
reimbursements). 453 Reinstatement of such licenses and authorizations could
be conditioned on successful treatment. Where public protection and
treatment demand a more intrusive approach, one scholar describes a system
of “robust receivership, or even temporary nationalization” that might be up
to the task. 454
450F

451F

452F

453F

454F

B. THE ROLE OF THE JURY

The previous Section’s emphasis on the importance of expertise for
treating insane corporations may prompt concern about the role of jurors.
When a defendant raises the insanity defense, it is the jury that decides
whether it applies. 455 Yet lay jurors typically lack the background in
organizational science needed to evaluate a corporate defendant’s internal
culture or compliance systems. 456
This sort of concern does not arise only for corporate defendants. Lay
jurors are just as inexpert about the medical sciences as they are about
organizational science. Of course, jurors are more familiar with applying the
psychological concepts of insanity to individuals than they are to
corporations. This casual use, though, makes things worse. Familiarity may
lend a sense of confidence, but it does not entail understanding. Often, jurors
455F

456F

450

See Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. REG. 109, 127–30 (2016);
Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate
Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1724 (2007).
451
See GARRETT, supra note 217, at 67–68 (detailing KPMG’s 2005 DPA and how the
DOJ chose to take no action regarding KPMG’s auditing privileges, though the government
could have suspended or debarred the firm).
452
E.g., 15 U.S.C. 7212(a) (accounting license to service publicly traded companies); 15
U.S.C. § 78 (broker-dealer license to trade stock of publicly owned companies).
453
E.g., 42 C.F.R. § 424.510 (authorized Medicare provider).
454
Thomas, supra note 196, at 955.
455
Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 11 (2006) (“‘[T]he fact of sanity, as any other
essential fact in the case, must be established to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”) (quoting Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897)).
456
See Valerie P. Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 182–90 (1989).
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attempting to apply medical concepts look for an “insane defendant [who]
resembles a crazy caricature” disconnected from actual medical
categories. 457
Some scholars argue for a more scientific approach to the insanity
defense. 458 If “the legal insanity defense [were] rooted in medicine,” jurors
would be less inclined to rely on background intuitions about what insanity
is and looks like. 459 In the corporate context, where the stakes for the public
are higher and the number of stakeholders affected by the disposition at trial
is greater, the argument for injecting more science into the process could be
even stronger. Regardless of whether scholars make any progress on this
front for individual defendants, courts could adopt a different process for
corporations. One way to do this could be to modify the rules of evidence
concerning expert testimony. Currently, expert insanity witnesses testifying
in federal court cannot opine on the ultimate issue of whether the defendant
was actually insane. 460 Removing this restriction in corporate cases would
give experts more influence in the courtroom.
There are a number of reasons that it is probably preferable to preserve
a strong role for lay juries in applying the corporate insanity defense.
Although insanity might be a scientific concept outside of the law, within the
courtroom it is ultimately a moral concept. “Courts have traditionally
stressed the distinction between mental disease as a ‘legal’ concept and
mental disease as a ‘medical’ concept.” 461 Some courts are quite blunt on the
matter: “[L]egal insanity has a different meaning and a different purpose than
the concept of medical insanity.” 462 The American Medical Association
agrees:
457F

458F

459F

460F

461F

462F

A defense premised on psychiatric models represents a singularly unsatisfactory, and
inherently contradictory approach to the issue of accountability . . . . The essential goal
of an exculpatory test for insanity is to identify the point at which a defendant’s mental
condition has become so impaired that society may confidently conclude that he has
lost his free will . . . . [F]ree will is an article of faith, rather than a concept that can be

457

Laufer, supra note 97, at 454.
See Reider, supra note 336, at 291 (“[O]ur current tests for insanity would benefit from
an exploration of the scientific world.”).
459
Beatrice R. Maidman, Note, The Legal Insanity Defense: Transforming the Legal
Theory into a Medical Standard, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1831, 1834 (2016).
460
FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
461
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 352, at 344.
462
State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 491 (Wash. 1983); see also State v. Singleton, 48
A.3d 285, 294 (N.J. 2012) (“The insanity defense exists in criminal law not to identify the
mentally ill, but rather to determine who among the mentally ill should be held criminally
responsible for their conduct.”).
458
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explained in medical terms . . . . Accordingly, since models of mental illness are
indeterminant in this respect, they can provide no reliable measure of responsibility. 463
463F

The decision for the jury to make is not whether the defendant has a mental
illness (scientific concept), but whether the mental illness he has negates
responsibility (moral concept). The latter is precisely the sort of judgment
that lay juries are competent to make. 464
The fundamentally moral nature of the insanity defense does not mean
that experts have no role to play. Expert testimony gives the jury insight into
the psychological facts needed to make a decision. “Ideally, psychiatrists—
much like experts in other fields—should provide grist for the legal mill,
should furnish the raw data upon which the legal judgment is based. It is the
psychiatrist who informs as to the mental state of the accused—his
characteristics, his potentialities, his capabilities.” 465
Especially in the corporate context, compliance and organizational
expert witnesses would aid the jury in evaluating a defendant’s
responsibility, but they probably should not testify to the ultimate issue of
insanity. By limiting psychiatric expert testimony, Congress sought “to
eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to
directly contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found
by the trier of fact.” 466 The legislation was backed by the American
Psychiatric Association. 467
The concern about experts capturing insanity determinations is even
more pressing in the corporate context. Less familiar with how large
organizations operate, jurors may relinquish control to expert opinion rather
464F

465F

466F

467F

463

Board of Trustees, Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials and Limitations of Psychiatric
Testimony, 251 JAMA 2967, 2978 (1984); see also SHUMAN, supra note 125, § 12:3 (“The
role played by psychiatric and psychological testimony in the insanity defense is further
complicated by many conceptual differences between law and the behavioral sciences of
psychiatry and psychology. The criminal law rests on the assumption that free will exists and
that it is therefore generally legally and morally appropriate to punish violations of the
criminal laws. Psychiatry and psychology focus on various biochemical, genetic, organic,
behavioral, and psychological explanations for behavior.”) (citation omitted).
464
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620 (2d Cir. 1966) (“[I]t is society as a whole,
represented by judge or jury, which decides whether a man . . . should or should not be held
accountable for his acts.”)
465
Id. at 619–20.
466
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 230 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412.
467
Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the
Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 686 (1983). But see Anne Lawson Braswell,
Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and the Insanity
Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620, 631, 635 (1987) (disagreeing with FRE 704(b) because
“juries may reject any expert’s opinion” and the rule “deprive[s] jurors of information
necessary to make that testimony helpful”).
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than relying on their personal moral perspective. 468 Expert information about
a corporate defendant’s organizational “disease or defect and [a] descri[ption
of] the characteristics and effects of the disease or defect” would aid
jurors. 469 Where large dollar values are at stake (as is often the case with
corporate trials), deference to compliance experts (some of whom will be
highly compensated and motivated defense witnesses) on ultimate issues
should give us pause.
For readers concerned about potential overuse of the corporate insanity
defense, there is additional appeal to leaving ultimate control with juries.
Successful assertion of the insanity defense is rare among individual criminal
defendants. 470 Available evidence comparing jury sympathy toward
similarly-situated corporate and individual defendants consistently reveals
bias against the former. 471 Keeping the defense firmly in the hands of juries
could be an effective means of ensuring that the standards for asserting the
corporate insanity defense remain high.
468F

469F

470F

471F

C. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS

Evidentiary standards govern access to the insanity defense and how the
defense operates. Proof is needed at three separate stages: trial, when the jury
decides whether to grant or deny the defense; post-trial, when the judge
decides whether to commit the acquittee to a treatment facility; and release,
when some official determines whether and under what terms the acquittee
may leave the treatment facility. Jurisdictions vary widely in the standards
and burdens they apply at each of these stages. Regardless of how
jurisdictions approach evidence for individual insanity claimants, they may
prefer a different, perhaps more demanding, arrangement for corporate
claimants. This Section proposes some best practices.
468

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 740 (2006) (“[T]here is the potential of mental-disease
evidence to mislead jurors (when they are the factfinders) through the power of this kind of
evidence to suggest that a defendant suffering from a recognized mental disease lacks
cognitive, moral, volitional, or other capacity, when that may not be a sound conclusion at
all.”). But see Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 352, at 346 (“Even when the law insists that
they express themselves in mechanistic terms, decisionmakers are likely to think and judge in
evaluative ones.”).
469
ARTHUR & HUNTER, supra note 160, § 12:18; United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574,
1576 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Morse, supra note 27, at 823 (“Experts should be limited to
offering both full, rich, clinical descriptions of thoughts, feelings, and actions and relevant
data based on sound scientific studies.”).
470
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 113, § 3:11
(“Since the Hinckley case and the subsequent narrowing of the insanity defense, few serious
crimes result in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.”).
471
See Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An
Examination of the “Deep-Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 L. & SOC. REV. 121, 133–34 (1996).
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1. At Trial
The default presumption at trial is that the defendant was sane at the
time of the alleged crime. 472 The initial burden of production is always on
the defendant to rebut that presumption. 473 “The burden that must be carried
by a defendant who raises the insanity issue . . . defines the strength of the
sanity presumption.” 474
Beyond uniformly placing the initial burden of production on the
defendant, states vary widely in their evidentiary standards for (dis)proving
insanity at trial. 475 Some states are very permissive. In Massachusetts, for
example, once a defendant provides any credible evidence of insanity, the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
sane at the time of the crime. 476 At the other end of the spectrum, states may
even (though none do today) reverse the burden and require the defendant to
prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 477 Federal law and most states
opt for a middle ground. They treat the insanity defense like any other
affirmative defense, which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence or clear and convincing evidence. 478
By setting the burden too high, jurisdictions risk convicting defendants
who are not criminally responsible. By setting it too low, they risk letting
those who are criminally responsible go free. As a general rule, the American
public seems more concerned with the latter. 479 In light of the general
suspicion with which lay people regard corporations, the concern would
472F

473F

474F

475F

476F

477F

478F

479F

472

W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Presumption of Continuing Insanity as Applied to Accused
in Criminal Case, 27 A.L.R.2d 121 § 11 (1953) (“The state, in a criminal prosecution,
normally has the benefit of a presumption that all persons are sane and criminally responsible,
so that, in most jurisdictions, the accused who contends that he is or was insane has the burden
of proving his mental incompetence, or at least of introducing evidence to meet the
presumption of sanity.”).
473
ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173(a).
474
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 769 (2006).
475
See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952).
476
Commonwealth v. Kostka, 350 N.E.2d 444, 451 (Mass. 1976).
477
In 1952, Oregon was the only state to require this. Leland, 343 U.S. at 798. Oregon has
since changed its approach. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.410 (West, Westlaw through 2020
Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.).
478
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 113, § 3:15;
see Clark, 548 U.S. at 769.
479
James W. Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity Defense: Proposals To Reform PostAcquittal Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 961, 963 (1986) (“[T]he popular
dissatisfaction with other issues, such as allocation of the burden of proof on the insanity issue
and the insanity standard, is fueled ultimately by concern over the possibility that too many
defendants are ‘getting off,’ which to many in the general public means ‘going free.’”)
(citation omitted).
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likely be amplified for corporate defendants. The profit motive, both for
corporate defendants and their highly compensated experts, could bias juries
against the defense in ways not usually applicable for individual defendants.
An additional worry is that skepticism about corporations improperly
benefiting from the insanity defense could bleed into greater skepticism
toward individual insanity.
These considerations favor a stronger burden for corporate criminal
defendants. For good reason, no state presently requires defendants to prove
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt; doing so would effectively foreclose the
defense. A demanding intermediary standard like clear and convincing
evidence seems the best affirmative burden of proof for corporate defendants.
2. Post-Trial Commitment
If a defendant successfully claims insanity, the court must then
determine what to do with him: release him or commit him to an institution
for treatment and evaluation. The stakes at this stage are palpable. The
defendant has successfully proven that he suffered from a mental disease or
defect that led him to commit a criminal act. If he is still insane, releasing
him could endanger the public and forfeit an opportunity to provide the
defendant with needed treatment. The risks are even greater for corporate
criminals. Because of corporations’ often far-reaching social and economic
standing, the public is more vulnerable to corporate misconduct than
individual misconduct. The law can mitigate these risks by tailoring the
procedure courts use when deciding whether and how to commit corporate
acquittees.
Jurisdictions have different standards for committing insanity
acquittees. Earlier in the defense’s history, commitment to a mental health
institution was automatic. 480 As Blackstone noted: “It was the doctrine of our
ancient law that persons deprived of their reason might be confined till they
recovered their senses, without waiting for the forms of a commission or
other special authority from the crown . . . .” 481 Today, some states still use
automatic commitment for a period to allow the court to determine whether
longer commitment is appropriate. 482 Federal law is illustrative: “[A]
person . . . found not guilty only by reason of insanity . . . shall be committed
480F

481F

482F

480

Barbara A. Weiner, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Sane Approach, 56 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1057, 1064–66 (1980).
481
J.W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH’S BLACKSTONE 745 (1959).
482
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186)
(“[“When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect of a
felony . . . the court shall commit the person to the department of health services for a specified
period . . . .”).
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to a suitable facility . . . .” 483 Within forty days, the court must then conduct
a follow-up hearing. 484 Some state jurisdictions require a showing of
continuing danger prior to any commitment. 485 Whether for temporary or
longer-term commitment, the inquiry is typically into whether the acquittee
poses a “substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage
of property of another due to a present mental disease or defect.” 486
Jurisdictions differ as to the standard of proof they require for
committing insanity acquittees. Some use the same higher standard generally
used for civil commitment (clear and convincing evidence), 487 others merely
require a preponderance of the evidence. 488 Under federal law, the standard
varies depending on the seriousness of the underlying crime. 489 Jurisdictions
also differ as to who bears the proof (be it the defendant or the state). 490
The rationale behind automatically committing successful insanity
claimants or for using lower thresholds of proof for commitment is
straightforward. “The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates
dangerousness.” 491 This has been the American Psychiatric Association’s
position regarding defendants acquitted by reason of insanity. 492 Moved by
483F

484F

485F

486F

487F

488F

489F

490F

491F

492F

483

18 U.S.C. § 4243(a).
18 U.S.C. § 4243(c).
485
ROBINSON, PALO, GANGULY, MOSKOVITZ & GRALL, supra note 47, § 173(g) n.91;
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON MENTAL HEALTH § 7–7.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
486
18 U.S.C. § 4243(d).
487
See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46C.253(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019
Reg. Sess. of 86th Legis.) (“The hearing on disposition shall be conducted in the same manner
as a hearing on an application for involuntary commitment under Subtitle C or D, Title 7,
Health and Safety Code . . . .”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(3)(a) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence).
488
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–2–314(e)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2020 First
Extraordinary Sess. of the 92nd Ark. Gen. Assemb.) (requiring preponderance of the
evidence).
489
18 U.S.C. § 4243(d).
490
Compare e.g., Milam v. State, 341 S.E.2d 216, 218 (Ga. 1986) (defendant), with People
v. Murphy, 331 N.W.2d 152, 157 (Mich. 1982) (state).
491
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983) (footnote omitted); see also Alter v.
Morris, 536 P.2d 630, 633 (Wash. 1975) (“[P]ast conduct is heavily indicative of the
likelihood that a person will commit similar acts which will again endanger others.”).
492
Insanity Defense Work Group, supra note 467, at 686 (“Their future dangerousness
need not be inferred; it may be assumed, at least for a reasonable period of time.”). But see
Ellis, supra note 479, at 986 (“[T]he APA’s statement that future dangerousness can be
‘assumed’ is thus unsupported, and indeed is contradicted by the existing studies. It simply is
not true that all (or even most) acquittees will engage in dangerous conduct in the future.”);
Morse, supra note 27, at 834 (“As I have shown, however, this presumption [of continuing
484
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this common-sense supposition, “[c]ourts have justified lower standards of
proof for commitment of insanity acquittees as an outgrowth of the normal
purpose of civil commitment: protecting the community from the
dangerously insane.” 493 Some courts show little concern with making
mistakes, i.e., committing someone who is, in fact, not insane, because, in
their view, such a person should not have benefited from the insanity defense
in the first place. 494 Committing such acquittees, the thinking goes, deprives
them of no liberty which they were otherwise due. Compulsory or
presumptive commitment also raises the stakes of a successful insanity
defense, thereby discouraging false pleas. 495
Ultimately, the decision about where to set the evidentiary standard for
commitment should turn on weighing the relative costs of false positives
(improperly committing an acquittee) and false negatives (improperly
releasing an acquittee). For individuals, this is a fraught balance to strike.
False negatives risk unnecessary danger to the public (and possibly to the
acquittee himself). False positives risk committing an acquittee who actually
is not a danger to himself or to others. This could happen, for example, if the
defendant was only temporarily insane at the time of the crime but is no
longer insane at the time of acquittal. 496 As such, false positives infringe on
493F

494F

495F

496F

insanity and dangerousness] is not justified. At most, the state should be entitled to brief
custody after an insanity acquittal during which the acquittee can be evaluated for a
commitment hearing to assess present disorder and consequent dangerousness.”); Bernard L.
Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 447–48
(1974).
493
Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, supra note 420, at 606–07 (footnotes
omitted).
494
Warren v. Harvey, 632 F.2d 925, 931 (2d Cir. 1980) (“While the acquittee therefore
may be deprived erroneously of his liberty in the commitment process, the liberty he loses is
likely to be liberty which society mistakenly had permitted him to retain in the criminal
process.”) (emphasis added).
495
Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962) (“[] Congress might have considered
it appropriate to provide compulsory commitment for those who successfully invoke an
insanity defense in order to discourage false pleas of insanity.”).
496
41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615, supra note 80, § 10 (“Temporary insanity may
constitute a sufficient defense to a criminal charge. Thus, if a defendant was insane at the time
of a particular offense, he may be found not guilty by reason of insanity regardless of whether
the period of insanity lasted several months or several hours.”) (footnote omitted); see also
People v. Kelly, 516 P.2d 875, 883 (Cal. 1973) (en banc); Commitment Following an Insanity
Acquittal, supra note 420, at 620 (identifying “several possible groups of insanity acquittees
who are neither criminally responsible for the act with which they were charged, nor insane
and dangerous enough to be criminally committed”); In re Franklin, 496 P.2d 465, 472 (Cal.
1972) (en banc).
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individuals’ weighty due process interests against unjustified infringement of
their liberty. 497
Like people, corporations can experience temporary insanity. For
example, a corporation with an otherwise stellar compliance program may
have committed a crime through a subversive rogue employee and promptly
fired him. In such a case, the corporation might qualify as legally insane
under the volitional test even though, after firing the rogue, it no longer has
a volitional deficit. 498 A treatment regimen could accomplish nothing since,
by hypothesis, the corporation already has effective compliance in place.
Despite the possibility of temporary corporate insanity, false positives
regarding commitment carry greater risks and false negatives less weighty
infringements. As mentioned, the public is much more vulnerable to
corporate crime than to individual crime. 499 Releasing a dangerous corporate
acquittee with no constraints or oversights can endanger many more people
than a typical dangerous individual. In contrast, corporations do not have the
same liberty interests at stake with false positives. As discussed above,
corporations cannot be physically incapacitated. Corporations that are being
treated will generally continue to operate; their employees will still show up
to work, their creditors will still receive payments, and their customers will
still receive goods and services. During that time, however, a planned
program of compliance reform would be in progress.
The cost-benefit ledger for corporate acquittees favors automatic
commitment. With respect to individuals, most jurisdictions require some
showing that the insanity which afflicted the defendant at the time of the
crime is continuing or permanent. 500 That showing should not be required
for corporate acquittees. This effectively sets up an unrebuttable
presumption, at least until commitment, that corporate acquittees continue to
497F

498F

499F

500F

497

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428–29 (1979).
Temporary corporate insanity is less likely for corporations that qualify under the
cognitive test. The sorts of mechanisms, e.g., corporate culture, that underlie cognitive deficits
in corporations are generally more durable.
499
The FBI estimates that the economic costs of white-collar crime are twenty times the
economic costs of all other crime combined. Compare RODNEY HUFF, CHRISTIAN DESILETS &
JOHN KANE, THE 2010 NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME 21 (2010) (“[The]
approximate the annual cost of white collar crime [is] between $300 and $660 billion.”), with
Kathryn E. McCollister, Michael T. French & Hai Fang, The Cost of Crime to Society: New
Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 98, 98–99 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2835847/
[https://perma.cc/4H2A-DQZ2] (“[M]ore than 23 million criminal offenses were committed
in 2007, resulting in approximately $15 billion in economic losses to the victims . . . .”).
500
Shipley, supra note 472, § 2 (“[I]t appears to be well established in most jurisdictions
that in order to give rise to such a presumption the evidence must disclose prior insanity which
was permanent or continuing in nature.”) (footnote omitted).
498
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be insane and to pose a public danger. The drafters of the federal insanity
defense took this stance toward individuals: “[I]nsanity, once established,
should be presumed to continue and the accused should automatically be
confined for treatment until it can be shown that he has recovered.” 501 The
Supreme Court has held that such a presumption does not violate due process:
“When a person . . . is found not guilty by reason of insanity . . . [it may be]
properly inferred that at the time of the verdict the defendant [i]s still
mentally ill and dangerous and hence c[an] be committed.” 502 Regardless of
the merits of this federal position toward individual acquittees, it should be
universally adopted for corporate acquittees. Given the significant risks of
failing to reform a dangerous corporation, any corporate criminal defendant
that benefits from the insanity defense should be presumed insane and then
required to submit to a searching expert evaluation of continuing
dangerousness.
501F

502F

3. Release
Once an insanity acquittee has been committed for treatment, there must
be a process to determine when he has completed his treatment and should
be released. The standards and process for release determine how long an
acquittee remains in state custody. They also determine what safety threshold
an acquittee’s condition must reach before releasing him to the public.
As the Supreme Court has held, an “acquittee may be held as long as he
is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer.” 503 Individual jurisdictions
have wide latitude to determine the timing of review, who has the power to
initiate review, the precise standard applicable, and who has the burden of
proving it. 504 The defendant or an official in the mental institution to which
the defendant is committed typically initiates the release process. 505 In most
503F

504F

505F

501

S. REP. NO. 84-1170, at 13 (1955).
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 76 (1992); see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,
366 (1983) (“We therefore conclude that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is a
sufficient foundation for commitment of an insanity acquittee for the purposes of treatment
and the protection of society.”). But see Robert C. Hunt & E. David Wiley, Operation
Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCH. 974, 978 (1968) (finding that insanity acquittees
are not significantly more dangerous); Henry J. Steadman, Follow-Up on Baxstrom Patients
Returned to Hospitals for the Criminally Insane, 130 AM. J. PSYCH. 317, 317 (1973)
(discussing the very small percentage of people who return to hospitals for the criminally
insane).
503
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77.
504
See Gretchen E. Rowan, Foucha v. Louisiana: Confinement Based on Dangerousness
Alone, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 736–743, 737 n.47 (1993).
505
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 322
(1972).
502
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jurisdictions, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion to show it is no
longer necessary to confine him. 506 Jurisdictions use different standards of
proof, from a preponderance of the evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt. 507
A range of more restrictive or lenient procedures are available. Federal
law illustrates an intermediate approach. An acquittee’s mental health
director initiates release by certifying that the acquittee has recovered from
his disease and no longer poses a substantial risk to person or property. 508
Release becomes official if a court subsequently agrees with the certification
under a clear and convincing standard. 509 Texas has a more acquitteefriendly process. That state mandates annual court review. 510 Commitment
continues only if a physician demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence
that continued commitment is “appropriate.” 511 Arizona has gone in the
opposite direction, placing the burden of proof on the acquittee and charging
a psychiatric security review board with making release decisions. 512
Once again, applying demanding but not prohibitively high standards
and burdens to corporate acquittees would be preferable. As to the length of
treatment, the law estimates that one to five years are needed to rehabilitate
corporations with defective compliance programs. Sentencing courts
ordering compliance-oriented probation are capped at a term of five years. 513
The pretrial diversion agreements that prosecutors design to improve
compliance programs in corporations suspected of misconduct also typically
range from one to five years. 514 Probation and pretrial diversion agreements
build in some flexibility by extending the termination date if the corporation
fails to cooperate. 515
Unlike probation or pretrial diversion, fixed terms of treatment would
likely be a mistake where the corporate insanity defense is concerned. The
law should strive to avoid any impression that it accords corporations
506F

507F

508F

509F

510F

511F

512F

513F

514F

515F

506

Id. at 324–25.
Id.
508
18 U.S.C. § 4243(f).
509
Id.
510
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46C.261(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.
of the 86th Leg.).
511
Id. (h).
512
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3994(C), (D), (F) (West, Westlaw through Second Reg. Sess.
of the 54th Leg.).
513
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
514
Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 450, at 1723.
515
See id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8F1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018) (“Upon a finding of a violation of a condition of probation, the court may extend the
term of probation, impose more restrictive conditions of probation, or revoke probation and
resentence the organization.”).
507
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preferential treatment. As for individuals, the term should be tied to treatment
success. 516 The length of time needed for treatment is difficult to predict in
advance. 517 The goal, after all, is to protect the public and rehabilitate the
corporation, not to impose punitive or lenient conditions.
Decisions about release should apply demanding standards and involve
multiple parties. Once again, it would be appropriate to place the burden of
production on the corporation to show that it no longer presents a danger to
person or property. The burden of persuasion should strike a balance between
the need to protect the public and the need to preserve the corporation as a
going concern. A clear-and-convincing-evidence standard rather than a
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt or a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
would be appropriate.
As to the identity of those with the power to initiate review and decide
on release, federal law for individuals provides a good model. The expert
designated to oversee and implement the corporation’s rehabilitation could
initiate the process by certifying that the corporation now has an effective
compliance program in place targeted to the violation of which it was
acquitted. A judge should then make the release determination. This will
provide some check on the possibility of industry capture, a concern that has
arisen in the pretrial diversion context. In all cases, release should be
conditional on appropriate terms, 518 such as the corporation maintaining its
compliance program and submitting to future compliance audits. 519
Treatment should resume if the corporation violates one of the conditions. 520
516F

517F

518F

519F

520F

516

Morse, supra note 27, at 827 (“A fixed hospital term, tied to the length of the prison
sentence allowed for the crime charged, is also improper for the same reason: hospital
commitment should be related to continuing disorder, not to irrelevant punishment concerns.
In large measure the terms of sentences are defined by the punishment the offender
deserves.”).
517
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (“[I]t is impossible to predict how
long it will take for any given individual to recover—or indeed whether he ever will
recover . . . .”).
518
Weihofen, supra note 420, at 867 (“Just as it is recognized today that parole should be
the normal method of release from prison, so conditional release under supervision should
become the normal method of release for this group of criminal insane.”).
519
18 U.S.C. § 4243(f)(2) (“[Where appropriate, a court may] (A) order that [an insanity
acquittee] be conditionally discharged under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or
psychological care or treatment that has been prepared for him . . . and (B) order, as an explicit
condition of release, that he comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or
psychological care or treatment.”).
520
Id. § 4243(g) (stating that if an acquittee violated a condition of release, “[he] may be
arrested” and the court will determine, following a hearing, whether “[he] should be remanded
to a suitable facility”).
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VI. VINDICATING VICTIMS
The corporate insanity defense—and the rehabilitative treatment it
portends for corporate acquittees—is the best way to vindicate the interests
of victims injured by insane corporations. There are three primary types of
interests victims have in the criminal process: justice, expressive, and
preventive. To see how the corporate insanity defense vindicates these
interests, one must set aside many assumptions drawn from the general part
of criminal law because corporate criminal law works very different.
A. JUSTICE INTERESTS

Generally, in criminal law, victims’ justice interests include being made
whole and seeing the defendant suffer. 521 The emphasis in corporate criminal
law is exclusively on the former. Corporations do not suffer. 522 The best the
law can do is to show it is being tough on crime and the defendant. As
explained above, the insanity defense does not conflict with that interest. A
successful insanity defense is the law’s way of recognizing that a defendant
is not fully responsible for his actions. If a defendant is not fully responsible,
the justice interest in seeing him suffer is correspondingly weaker. In any
case, insanity acquittees often face just as harsh—or even harsher—treatment
than they would have if the defense had not been available. This fact would
be no different for corporate acquittees.
As to victims’ financial interests, it bears repeating that corporate
acquittees should, and would, still be obliged to make their victims whole. A
successful insanity defense does not mean there has been no injury. Often,
victims or regulators will be able to bring a civil suit for damages. 523 Insanity
is no defense outside criminal law. 524 Examples abound of private parties
successfully suing insane defendants, 525 sometimes even after the defendant
521F

522F

523F

524F

525F

521

Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime
Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 159 (1996).
522
Diamantis, supra note 253, at 879; Dynamic Image Techs. v. United States, 221 F.3d
34, 37 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[C]orporations, unlike natural persons, have no emotions . . . .”).
523
Delahanty v. Hinckley, 799 F.Supp. 184, 186 (D.D.C. 1992) (“[Though not criminally
liable,] [an] insane person is liable for compensatory damages for his torts where express
malice or evil intent is not a necessary element of the tort.”) (citation omitted).
524
See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 130
(2d ed. 2020); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 (AM. L. INST. 2010); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (AM. L. INST. 1965). But see Breunig v. Am. Family Ins., 173
N.W.2d 619, 627 (Wis. 1970) (upholding defense to civil suit for sudden onset of insanity).
525
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill. 1887) (shooting; “It is well settled
that, though a lunatic is not punishable criminally, he is liable in a civil action for any tort he
may commit.”); Jewell v. Colby, 24 A. 902, 902 (N.H. 1890) (“On the facts stated in the case,
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mounted a successful insanity defense in a criminal trial for the same
underlying misconduct. 526 Connecticut, the lone jurisdiction with some
contrary authority (at least, the only one I could find), 527 has since changed
its approach. 528
Criminal courts faced with an insane corporate defendant might be able
to speed victim recovery using the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act
(“MVRA”). The Act makes restitution for the full amount of victim losses
mandatory in certain instances, notwithstanding any other provision of
federal law, and even where the defendant cannot pay. 529 Since criminal
punishment is prohibited for insanity acquittees, the applicability of the
MVRA turns on whether restitution counts as punishment. Some states, in
applying their own version of the MVRA, have found that restitution is
punitive. 530 Federal circuits seem to be of the opposite view. 531 The Supreme
Court has given mixed signals. 532 Other scholars and I have argued that
restitution is not punitive since its purpose is to make victims whole rather
526F

527F

528F

529F

530F

531F

532F

evidence of the defendant’s insanity is not admissible to defeat the right to
recover . . . .”); Bollinger v. Rader, 69 S.E. 497, 497 (N.C. 1910) (killing); Seals v. Snow, 254
P. 348, 349 (Kan. 1927) (killing); Ross v. York, 233 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
(shooting); Shapiro v. Tchernowitz, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (wrongful
death); Bolen v. Howard, 452 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Ky. 1970) (shooting).
526
See, e.g., Parke v. Dennard, 118 So. 396, 399 (Ala. 1928); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Porter, 181 F. Supp. 81, 88 (D.D.C. 1960); Vosnos v. Perry, 357 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1976); Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 472–73 (Conn. 1988).
527
Fitzgerald v. Lawhorn, 294 A.2d 338 (Conn. 1972).
528
Polmatier, 537 A.2d at 468.
529
18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1), 3664(f)(1)(A).
530
See, e.g., State v. Garnett, 916 A.2d 393, 396–98 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007); State v.
Thomas, 69 P.3d 814, 814–15 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (per curiam).
531
See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing that
“the [statute’s] intended beneficiaries are the victims, not the victimizers” and that “[t]he
criminal has no rights under the quoted provision”); Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act – Constitutional Issues, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 239, §§ 8, 10, 11, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28 (2007) (noting Sixth and Eighth Amendments inapplicable to
restitution).
532
Compare Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 365 (2005) (holding that the
purpose of restitution is to “mete out appropriate criminal punishment”), with Hughey v.
United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990) (holding that the purpose of restitution is to
“compensate victims”); see also Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 612–13 (2010) (“[The
MVRA] seeks . . . primarily to ensure that victims of a crime receive full restitution . . . and
only secondarily to help the defendant.”); Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?,
100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 98 (2014) (“[W]hen restitution is imposed as a part of sentencing in a
criminal case, the restitution is punishment.”).
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than to inconvenience the defendant. 533 Corporate acquittees should be
required to pay victim restitution, regardless of the stance jurisdictions take
toward individual acquittees.
533F

B. EXPRESSIVE INTERESTS

Victims’ expressive interests in criminal law include having an
opportunity to tell their story at trial 534 and having public condemnation of
the wrong that was done to them. 535 The impact the insanity defense has on
those interests depends on the baseline for comparison. For individual
criminal defendants, the baseline is an alternative where, at the end of trial,
insane defendants are convicted rather than acquitted. Since the trial still
occurs and victims still have the opportunity to serve as witnesses, the effect
of the insanity defense on their interest in telling their story is a wash. Since
insane individual defendants are not convicted, victims’ interest in the public
condemnation is arguably diminished by the defense.
The comparative baseline for corporate offenders is very different.
Corporate prosecutions and convictions are rare events. 536 Investigations into
the most significant corporate wrongdoing, affecting the greatest number of
victims, routinely ends in pretrial diversion. 537 These deals, cut by
prosecutors and corporate suspects in secret negotiations, avoid corporate
trial and conviction in exchange for concessions by the corporation (usually
in the form of fines and compliance reform). 538 The corporate parties agree
to a statement of facts, but typically will not admit guilt. 539 Everything is “off
the books” since courts have no oversight and the facts are never entered into
534F

535F

536F

537F

538F

539F

533
See Diamantis, supra note 43, at 534–35; Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New
Paradigm for Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279, 300 (1977) (arguing that restitution should be
purely compensatory in nature and therefore should be imposed according to the nature and
consequences of the crime, even on criminal defendants who are not criminally responsible
by reason of insanity).
534
See The Trauma of Victimization, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
https://members.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crimevictims/trauma-of-victimization [https://perma.cc/U8LJ-K8DB] (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
535
David Alm, Crime Victims and the Right to Punishment, 13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 63, 69
(2019).
536
Diamantis & Laufer, supra note 71, at 454.
537
GARRETT, supra note 217, at 162.
538
Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 159–60 (2008).
539
Buell, supra note 437, at 89 (“Notice that there is nothing traditionally criminal in this
arrangement—no guilty plea or jury verdict, no sentencing, no punishment other than a fine.”).
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the public record. 540 Many feel that these agreements let corporations off too
leniently and procure very little by way of actual change or sanction. 541
Prosecutorial oversight and follow-through on the terms of the agreements
are also often lacking. 542 Judges who attempt to exercise any real oversight
find their hands tied by the separation of powers concerns—pretrial diversion
agreements are the exclusive prerogative of the executive. 543
The corporate insanity defense holds out the prospect of having more
criminal trials of corporations that would presently receive pretrial diversion
agreements. One major barrier to trying corporations is that, in many
sectors, 544 convicted corporations lose essential business privileges, like
environmental permits, 545 the authority to audit publicly traded
companies, 546 or the right to submit receipts to Medicare and Medicaid. 547
These collateral consequences are life-ending. 548 DOJ guidelines instruct
prosecutors to bear these collateral consequences in mind when deciding
whether to charge corporations. 549 The usual result is pretrial diversion. The
corporate insanity defense alters the calculus by sometimes giving
prosecutors a means of bringing corporations to trial while avoiding
conviction and its collateral effects.
More corporate criminal trials would mean satisfying more of victims’
expressive interests, even for trials that end with a successful insanity
defense. Typically, a defendant raises the insanity defense only after the facts
pertaining to guilt are clear. 550 “A plea of not guilty by reason of
540F

541F

542F

543F

544F

545F

546F

547F

548F

549F

550F

540
United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 736–38 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Lisa Kern
Griffin, Inside-Out Enforcement, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 67, at 110
(“DPAs are less visible than adjudication, which detracts from both the coherence of the
government’s enforcement strategy and the accountability of prosecutors.”).
541
GARRETT, supra note 217, at 63 (“Corporations plead guilty, and a plea agreement can
include similar terms . . . . A deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement is even more
lenient, though, because it . . . avoids both an indictment and a criminal conviction.”).
542
Id. at 75 (“These data suggest that prosecutors are not taking structural reform seriously.”).
543
Fokker, 818 F.3d at 736–38.
544
Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial
Discretion to Impose Structural Reform, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 67,
at 65.
545
42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (Clean Water Act).
546
15 U.S.C. § 77t(b); 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(2).
547
48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a).
548
Rachel Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM, supra note 67, at 179.
549
Thompson Memo, supra note 209, at 3.
550
41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 615, supra note 80, § 19 (“When a defendant seeks to
raise the defense of insanity, the court must decide whether there should be a unitary trial, in
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insanity . . . does not implicate guilt or innocence but, instead, determines
whether the accused shall be punished for the guilt which has already been
established.” 551 During the guilt phase of a corporate trial, victims will have
an opportunity to tell their narratives and memorialize their experiences of
corporate wrongdoing in an official, public setting.
Resolving corporate wrongdoing with an insanity defense can also
satisfy victims’ expressive interests in public condemnation better than
pretrial diversion. Pretrial diversion cuts any note of condemnation out of the
process. The resolution is contractual rather than criminal. When
corporations raise a successful insanity defense at trial, the verdict is one of
acquittal, but acquittal with expressive bite. An acquittal by reason of insanity
is importantly different from a finding of innocence or an acquittal premised
on other defenses. Jurisdictions vary in exactly how they phrase the verdict.
Federal law is representative: “[T]he court shall find the defendant—(1)
guilty; (2) not guilty; or (3) not guilty only by reason of insanity.” 552 The
latter option recognizes that victims were wronged even as it ultimately
precludes criminal punishment of the defendant. Many states have gone a
step further, allowing verdicts of “guilty but insane.” 553 As one commentator
remarked, this effectively “mean[s] ‘guilty,’” even if it is not formally a
conviction. 554
551F

552F

553F

554F

C. PREVENTIVE INTERESTS

Victims have a deep interest in preventing criminal wrongdoing from
recurring. The interest extends to their own future integrity and also to other
possible future victims. By doing what it can to prevent criminals from
which evidence as to both guilt and insanity are presented during the same trial, or a bifurcated
trial. In a bifurcated trial, the first phase focuses exclusively on whether the defendant
committed the charged crime. The second phase focuses solely on the question of insanity.
The second stage is not reached unless and until the prosecution proves in the first phase
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a criminal act . . . . Bifurcation is
often preferred on the basis that a unitary trial is fraught with confusion.”).
551
People v. Blakely, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876, 878 (2014) (internal quotation marks and
emphasis omitted).
552
18 U.S.C. § 4242(b). Federal law thirty-five years ago was different. Shannon v.
United States, 512 U.S. 573, 575 (1994) (“Prior to the enactment of the Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984 . . . [d]efendants who mounted a successful insanity defense—that is,
those who raised a reasonable doubt as to their sanity at the time of the offense—were simply
found ‘not guilty.’”).
553
Diane Courselle, Mark Watt & Donna Sheen, Suspects, Defendants, and Offenders
with Mental Retardation in Wyoming, 1 WYO. L. REV. 1, 54–55 n.268 (2001).
554
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
13 n.68 (2003).
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recidivating, the law shows victims that it takes the harm done to them
seriously.
The preventive aspects of the insanity defense are often overlooked in
defendant-focused discussions. By removing a dangerously insane acquittee
from the general population, the law protects his victims, past and future,
from injury. Yet it is not enough simply to remove the acquittee; it is
important that the insanity defense ordinarily operates to place the acquittee
in a treatment facility. Simply imprisoning the acquittee would only relocate
the risks he poses from the general population to the prison population. 555
Prisons are ill-equipped to handle insane inmates or to prevent their harmful
interactions with prison officials and other inmates. 556 Treatment facilities
serve two preventive purposes. First, because of their expertise relative to
prisons, they are better suited to address the risks that acquittees pose during
confinement. Second, because most of those who commit crimes will
eventually be released, treatment reduces the risks that acquittees pose after
confinement. Returning a dangerously insane person back to public life
would expose his past and future victims to significant risk. While prison life
often exacerbates mental health issues, 557 insanity acquittees who are
released after hospitalization have lower rearrest rates than “sane” defendants
convicted of committing the same crimes. 558
Similar reasoning would apply to criminal corporations acquitted under
the insanity defense. I have argued extensively elsewhere that the only way
to effectively prevent corporate criminal recidivism is through forcible
rehabilitation. 559 The arguments apply with even greater force to
corporations whose dysfunction justifies their use of the insanity defense. In
brief, the two approaches the law currently uses—threatening corporate fines
555F

556F

557F

558F

559F

555

JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 58 (1975).
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf
(describing the prison environment—being intended for punishment—as conflicting with
insane inmates’ mental health needs).
557
See, e.g., id. at 94–105, 153–54 (noting examples of inmates’ worsening mental health
due to understaffing, lack of timely resources, and inadequate monitoring and citing prison
segregation as a key reason for inmates’ deteriorating mental condition).
558
Weihofen, supra note 420, at 868–69 (“Meaningful statistics are difficult to obtain, but
such as exist indicate that persons acquitted of crime by reason of insanity and subsequently
discharged from the hospital as recovered are not more likely to commit further crimes than
are persons with similar prior criminal records who have never been in a mental hospital . . . .
If anything, the rate of subsequent arrest among ex-mental patients with a record of criminal
arrest prior to hospitalization seems to be lower than rearrest rates in persons with similar
records who had not been in a mental hospital.”).
559
See generally Diamantis, supra note 43 (arguing that fining corporations does not
promote reform or deterrence).
556
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and prosecutor-led reform—do not work. Empirical studies demonstrate that
increasing corporate fines does not increase corporate deterrence. 560 The
basic economic reason is simple: agency costs. 561 A corporate fine, paid by
the corporation, does not directly impact the incentives of the individuals
within a corporation who are in a position to commit or avoid crime. 562
Prosecution-led reform through pretrial diversion fails in part because of
what some scholars call the “compliance game”: The DOJ seems more
interested in scoring political points and clearing cases than ensuring
meaningful solutions to corporate crime. 563 Even well-intentioned
prosecutors lack the expertise and institutional competence to design,
implement, or oversee effective corporate reform. 564 Where a corporate
criminal exhibits the sort of dysfunction that could justify an insanity
defense, corporate fines and prosecutors are particularly inept. The selfsame
dysfunction can hinder the rational cost-benefit mechanisms by which fines
have their intended preventive effects. Such corporations are also in even
greater need of the expert guidance that prosecutors cannot provide.
Effective prevention would require court oversight and injecting more
expertise into the process. The corporate insanity defense promises both.
Court oversight could be a solution to the compliance game by bringing some
objectivity to the resolution of corporate cases. 565 As discussed above, the
corporate insanity defense lowers some of the barriers prosecutors face in
taking criminal corporations to trial. Trials bring courts onto the scene, and
court involvement would continue post-acquittal through supervision of
reform. Since the treatment would be designed, overseen, and implemented
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by compliance experts, it would be better suited to securing the crime-free
future that victims deserve.
CONCLUSION: WILL CORPORATIONS GO FOR IT?
All serious corporate crime provokes our instinctive ire. As in the
general part of criminal law, enlightened policy does not always favor
submitting to the lure of instinct. When a defendant lacks sufficient selfcontrol or the capacity to distinguish right from wrong, all of the basic goals
of criminal justice call for an alternative to punishment. Sanction cannot
deliver desert where none is called for. The threat of sanction cannot deter
where control and cognition are compromised. This is just as true of
volitionally- and cognitively impaired corporate defendants as it is of
individual defendants. The insanity defense offers a needed alternative.
Fairness to defendants is the primary motivation for the insanity defense
in the individual context; in the corporate context, it is respect for victims.
Corporations who successfully raise the insanity defense would immediately
be neutralized as public threats through necessary constraints on their
business conduct. While those constraints are in place, corporate acquittees
would face an intensive treatment program, designed and implemented by
government experts. The constraints would only be released once the experts
certify, and a court determines, that the corporation no longer poses a danger.
Victims can rest assured that they and others will not face injury again. At
the same time, other innocent corporate stakeholders benefit as the
corporations on whom their livelihood rests would remain ongoing concerns.
While an initial concern about the corporate insanity defense could be
that it would prove too much of a boon for corporations, the opposite concern
now arises: Will corporations find the defense attractive enough raise it? The
benefits of the defense only materialize if corporations can see an overall
advantage in it. If acquitted, corporations can avoid the reputational costs of
conviction, but being declared “criminally insane” would hardly make for an
easy public relations challenge. As one managerial psychologist wrote:
“Viewed from the necessarily pragmatic viewpoint of the practicing
consultant and corporate client, are there many CEOs out there who want to
be told that ‘I diagnosed your organization and I am sorry to inform you that
the entire system suffers from narcissistic personality disorder or borderline
personality disorder?’” 566 Adding insult to injury, executives and managers
seem to be particularly averse to the sort of oversight and rehabilitative
corporate treatment that the insanity defense would necessarily entail.
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Compulsory reform can be expensive, and it infringes the autonomy interests
that managers’ guard so closely. 567
Despite these costs, there are three compelling advantages that the
insanity defense offers corporations. First, as compared to conviction,
acquittal under the insanity defense would avoid the fatal collateral
consequences that can follow a guilty verdict. Many convicted corporations
automatically face various restrictions—like debarment or loss of license—
that effectively terminate their ability to ply their trade. 568 Any resolution
that avoids that result should be preferable from the corporation’s
perspective.
Second, there is reason for corporations to prefer reform following an
insanity defense over reform pursuant to a pretrial diversion agreement. If
acquitted at trial under the insanity defense, corporations could avoid paying
the criminal fines that are a near ubiquitous feature of pretrial diversion
agreements. 569 Additionally, corporations may see some benefit to having
courts involved in their rehabilitation. Pretrial diversion agreements
commonly reserve to the DOJ exclusive and total discretion to determine
whether the corporation has complied. 570 This despotic dynamic raises
obvious concerns for corporations. 571 Judicial oversight following a
successful insanity plea should result in a more objective and balanced
process.
The third and final appeal of the corporate insanity defense for
corporations is that, if all goes as it should, corporate acquittees emerge with
an expert certification and court validation that they are now reliable business
partners, service providers, employers, and community members. In short,
567F

568F

569F

570F

571F

567
William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone, 20 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 392,
392 (2018); see Fisse, supra note 227, at 1155 (“A recent discussion of the potential use of
probation as a sanction against corporations pointed out that probationary orders requiring
corporations to rectify defective standard operating procedures or to make other structural
changes within the organization may have a significant deterrent as well as rehabilitative effect
because such intervention detracts from managerial autonomy.”) (footnote omitted).
568
Baer, supra note 430, at 956 (“Although corporate entities are technically criminally
liable for nearly all of their employees’ misconduct, the government has learned not to
formally prosecute these entities due to the steep collateral consequences of indictment.”).
569
See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 450, at 1723–24.
570
Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of
Corporations” Charging Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means
for the Purposes of the Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 61–62 (2014);
Andrew Chinsky, Essay, Modern Approaches to Financial Crime: Judge Rakoff, The
Financial Crisis, DPAs, and Too Big to Prosecute, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 12, 28 (2014).
571
Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1437 (2007) (discussing “[t]he abusive tendencies of [the
DPA and NPA] bargaining imbalance”).

92

DIAMANTIS

[Vol. 111

they reenter public life with a credible claim to having become good
corporate citizens. This credential should significantly mitigate the
reputational effects of a criminal trial. A corporation that has successfully
undergone treatment for the root cause of its criminal behavior is a
corporation that is unlikely to reoffend. That is a result that everyone
involved in the criminal justice process—the corporate defendant, its victims,
the judge, the prosecutor, and the public—can applaud.

